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1 
ARTICLE 
Speech-Facilitating Conduct 
Wesley J. Campbell* 
Abstract. Free speech doctrine generally protects only expression, leaving regulations of 
nonexpressive conduct beyond the First Amendment’s scope. Yet the Supreme Court has 
recognized that abridgments of the freedom of speech “may operate at different points in 
the speech process.” This notion of protection for nonexpressive conduct that facilitates 
speech touches on many of the most contentious issues in First Amendment law—
restrictions on photography and audiovisual recording, limits on campaign contributions, 
putative newsgathering privileges for journalists, compelled subsidization of speech, and 
associational rights, to name just a few. Scholars, however, have generally approached 
these topics in isolation, typically focusing on downstream effects on speech as the 
touchstone for First Amendment coverage. The usual conclusion is that the Supreme 
Court’s decisions are in disarray. 
This Article argues that key features of doctrine are easily overlooked when employing a 
granular focus on particular rights. Instead, the Article presents an overarching 
framework that brings together, descriptively and normatively, otherwise disparate 
strands of free speech law. The guiding principle of this framework is that First 
Amendment coverage for nonexpressive conduct depends on whether the government 
uses a rule that targets speech (e.g., a special tax on newspapers), not on whether expression 
is indirectly burdened by particular applications of otherwise constitutional rules (e.g., a 
child labor law applied to newspapers). Applications of this “anti-targeting” principle vary 
by context, but the general concept offers a surprisingly comprehensive account of most 
Supreme Court decisions. Tracing the development of the anti-targeting principle also 
reveals an underappreciated shift in the way that the Court has dealt with claims based on 
nonexpressive conduct. This historical argument shows that the reasoning in many of the 
Court’s foundational cases—including Buckley v. Valeo, Branzburg v. Hayes, Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education, and Roberts v. United States Jaycees—is now out of step with current 
doctrine. 
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Introduction 
A familiar, if sometimes nebulous, distinction between “expression” and 
“nonexpressive conduct” undergirds modern free speech doctrine.1 Expressive 
acts—from speaking and publishing to burning flags and dancing in the nude—
generally “bring the First Amendment into play,” triggering closer judicial 
scrutiny.2 But when the regulated conduct is nonexpressive, courts often say 
that the First Amendment does not apply at all.3 Expressive conduct does not 
have to convey “a narrow, succinctly articulable message,”4 but the Supreme 
Court has derided the idea that “an apparently limitless variety of conduct can 
be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends 
thereby to express an idea.”5 
Yet it is widely recognized that some protections for nonexpressive 
conduct are essential to basic First Amendment freedoms. Ordinary 
commercial transactions are not expressive, for instance, but prohibitions on 
the distribution or acquisition of printing presses or computers would raise 
obvious First Amendment concerns.6 Picture taking and video recording are 
often not expressive,7 but courts have ridiculed the “extreme” and 
 
 1. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (“[R]estrictions on protected 
expression are distinct from restrictions on . . . nonexpressive conduct.”); Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“First Amendment cases draw vital 
distinctions between words and deeds . . . .”). For more on the distinction between 
“expressive” and “nonexpressive” conduct, including criticisms of this division, see infra 
notes 41-50 and accompanying text.  
 2. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1989); see infra notes 47-50 and accompanying 
text.  
 3. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) 
(“The issue presented is whether respondents have a First Amendment right to solicit 
contributions . . . . To resolve this issue we must first decide whether solicitation in 
[this] context . . . is speech protected by the First Amendment, for, if it is not, we need 
go no further.”); Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc) 
(“[A]lthough the Supreme Court has defined the boundaries of expression broadly, it 
never has extended the protections of the First Amendment to non-expressive 
conduct.” (citation omitted)). 
 4. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995); 
see also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) (“[A] message 
may be delivered by conduct that is intended to be communicative and that, in context, 
would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be communicative.”). 
 5. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 6. See, e.g., Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664 (“[R]estrictions on protected expression are distinct 
from restrictions on economic activity . . . .”). 
 7. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1042 (2015) 
(“The act of recording is not itself expressive in the way that burning a flag is 
expressive because it does not communicate a message; it creates a message to be 
communicated later.”); Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of 
Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 
OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 270 (2004). 
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“extraordinary” idea that such conduct “is wholly unprotected by the First 
Amendment.”8 Similarly, although financial transfers are often thought of as 
nonspeech, “virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass 
society requires the expenditure of money.”9 
In this vein, the Supreme Court has recognized some First Amendment 
protection for the speech process, and not merely the expressive end product. 
“Laws enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at different points in 
the speech process,” the Court recently explained.10 To many, this notion of 
protection for the speech process is intuitive. We can hardly “disaggregate 
Picasso from his brushes and canvas,” or “value Beethoven without the benefit 
of strings and woodwinds,” one court of appeals colorfully opined.11  
But full First Amendment coverage for nonexpressive acts that are tied to 
speech would quickly become unwieldy. “[F]ew restrictions on action,” the 
Court observed fifty years ago, “could not be clothed by ingenious argument in 
the garb of decreased data flow.”12 Confronted with claims for protection of 
nonexpressive acts that facilitate speech, the Court has steadfastly remained 
“unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey to . . . an 
uncertain destination.”13 How, then, should courts decide whether to apply 
some form of elevated First Amendment scrutiny to governmental restrictions 
of nonexpressive conduct?  
The academic literature about First Amendment coverage for speech-
facilitating conduct generally falls into three camps. First are studies that focus 
on particular types of conduct, like gathering information, financing 
campaigns, engaging in scientific research, or associating with others.14 A 
second group of scholars takes a much broader approach by considering all 
incidental burdens on speech, whether falling on expressive or nonexpressive 
conduct.15 Finally, a third camp denies that a claimant’s expressive purposes 
 
 8. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 594 (7th Cir. 2012); see also A. Michael Froomkin, 
The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1511 (2000) (“It is inconceivable . . . that a 
ban on capturing all photographic images in public could possibly be squared with the 
First Amendment, any more than could a ban on carrying a notebook and a pencil.”); cf. 
Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82-83 (1st Cir. 2011) (discussing a right to record).   
 9. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam). 
 10. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010). This insight is hardly novel. See, e.g., 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he First 
Amendment protects a process . . . .”); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (“Liberty 
of circulating is as essential to [press] freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without 
the circulation, the publication would be of little value.”).  
 11. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 12. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965). 
 13. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703 (1972). 
 14. See infra Part I.B; see also Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 1035-36 (observing similarly the 
literature’s disjointed treatment of speech-facilitating conduct). 
 15. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1175, 1200-10 (1996); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental 
footnote continued on next page 
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implicate the First Amendment when the government regulates nonexpressive 
conduct, but this group of scholars does not explore other ways that free 
speech doctrine might cover nonexpressive conduct.16  
This Article charts a different path by considering speech-facilitating 
conduct as a distinct category within First Amendment law.17 The 
nonexpressive conduct involved in these cases may come before speech (e.g., 
donating money or traveling to a protest) or afterward (e.g., receiving speaker 
fees or traveling home). The potential reach of these rights is broad, but this 
Article does not address protection for actions that count as “expressive” on 
their own, like writing or delivering books.18 Rather, it explores the coverage 
that the Supreme Court has provided and denied to nonexpressive conduct, 
addressing only whether the First Amendment applies at all—not whether any 
particular restriction can survive some form of elevated scrutiny.19 
By looking at speech-facilitating conduct as a distinct category, an 
overarching framework can bring together, descriptively and normatively, 
otherwise disparate strands of First Amendment law. The guiding principle of 
 
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 491-500 (1996); Frederick 
Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions on 
Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779 (1985); Srikanth Srinivasan, Incidental 
Restrictions of Speech and the First Amendment: A Motive-Based Rationalization of the 
Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 401 (1995); Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 105-14 (1987).  
 16. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 769 (2001); 
see also infra note 52. 
 17. This Article joins Ashutosh Bhagwat’s recent work in broadly considering how the 
First Amendment applies to nonexpressive conduct related to speech. See Bhagwat, 
supra note 7, at 1035. The scope of this Article and its historical orientation, however, 
depart substantially from Bhagwat’s article, which addresses questions of First 
Amendment coverage in much less depth than questions of protection. Bhagwat mostly 
takes for granted that general laws pose no constitutional problem and that speech-
targeted laws do, see id. at 1061, whereas this Article evaluates the long-running and 
contested debates about those coverage issues. 
 18. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001). 
 19. As Frederick Schauer explains, “questions about the involvement of the First 
Amendment in the first instance”—known as questions of coverage—“are often far more 
consequential than are the issues surrounding the strength of protection that the First 
Amendment affords the speech to which it applies.” Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries 
of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1765, 1767 (2004); see also id. at 1771 (“Questions about the boundaries of the First 
Amendment are not questions of strength . . . but rather are questions of scope—
whether the First Amendment applies at all.”). Confusingly, the Supreme Court 
sometimes refers to questions of coverage as ones of protection, but—putting aside the 
labels—the coverage/protection dichotomy underpins all of modern free speech law. 
See, e.g., Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803-04 (1984) 
(“[T]o say the ordinance presents a First Amendment issue is not necessarily to say that 
it constitutes a First Amendment violation.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Metromedia, 
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 561 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting))).   
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this framework is that coverage for nonexpressive conduct depends on 
whether the government uses a rule that targets speech—including speech-
related rules that target the speech process.20 Applications of this “anti-
targeting” principle vary by context,21 but the general concept offers a 
surprisingly comprehensive account of most on-point Supreme Court 
decisions. 
Examining speech-facilitating conduct as a distinct category also reveals a 
substantial, yet mostly unannounced, shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to 
First Amendment coverage for nonexpressive conduct. Prior to the mid-1980s, 
the Supreme Court often treated all sorts of incidental burdens on speech as 
implicating the First Amendment, even when the laws being applied did not 
explicitly target speech.22 During this bygone era, the Court issued rulings that 
continue to undergird some of the most significant and contentious areas of 
free speech law, including newsgathering privileges, campaign finance law, 
compelled-subsidy doctrine, and associational rights.  
Ever since its 1986 decision in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,23 however, the 
Court has mostly stopped applying First Amendment scrutiny to general (i.e., 
nontargeted) regulations of nonexpressive conduct.24 When nonexpressive 
conduct is regulated, only the law—not individual expressive aims—can bring 
the First Amendment into play. Conceptually, free speech rights in this field 
operate as rules about rules, not as “shields,” “immunities,” or “trumps” that 
 
 20. Scholars have not used the anti-targeting principle to evaluate thoroughly the scope 
and history of coverage for speech-facilitating conduct, but the principle is recognized 
in opinions and in scholarship. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 
513 U.S. 454, 474-75 (1995) (applying heightened review to a ban on public employees’ 
receipt of funds for speech because Congress “chose to restrict only expressive 
activities”); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502  
U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (applying heightened review to a speech-targeted law requiring 
convicted criminals to turn over the proceeds of their book sales); Bhagwat, supra   
note 7, at 1064 (“[P]resumably these [targeted] laws must be subject to some scrutiny.”); 
Eugene Volokh, Why Buckley v. Valeo Is Basically Right, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1095, 1101 
(2002) (arguing that targeting “a constitutional right for a special burden” creates a 
constitutional harm and therefore “restricting speech that uses money is a speech 
restriction”). 
 21. In this sense, this Article proceeds on the unremarkable premise that general principles 
are worthy of study despite the need for contextually tailored doctrine. See, e.g., 
Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three 
Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 83-84 (2001). 
 22. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985) (applying heightened 
scrutiny to an unlawful-entry charge); see also infra Part II (discussing cases prior to 
1986). 
 23. 478 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1986); see infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text. 
 24. Cf. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 576 n.3 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“A law is ‘general’ for the present purposes if it regulates conduct without 
regard to whether that conduct is expressive.”). 
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protect particular forms of speech-facilitating conduct against governmental 
infringement.25 
The Court’s decision in Arcara did not require overruling prior decisions, 
and the Justices failed to mention their significant departure from earlier 
reasoning—what some have described as “stealth overruling.”26 Confusion has 
been widespread ever since. Scholarly assessments of newsgathering privileges, 
campaign finance law, compelled-subsidy doctrine, and associational rights, for 
instance, continue to rely on the outdated reasoning in seminal decisions like 
Branzburg v. Hayes,27 Buckley v. Valeo,28 Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,29 and 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees.30 Broader analyses of the Court’s approach to 
incidental burdens on speech similarly depend on old cases. In particular, this 
Article takes issue with the arguments of Michael Dorf and Geoffrey Stone that 
significant incidental burdens trigger heightened scrutiny.31 And beyond these 
lines of cases, the failure to grapple with the Court’s shift has skewed 
discussions of novel questions involving nonexpressive conduct, like how 
courts should assess the constitutionality of restrictions on photography and 
other forms of audiovisual recording.32 
 
 25. Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional 
Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (1998) (using the term “shields”); Richard H. Pildes, Why 
Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 725, 728 (1998) [hereinafter Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps] (adopting 
the term “immunities”); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at xi, 184-205 
(1977) (employing the term “trumps”). All three of these authors have noted that 
modern free speech doctrine often allows for regulations of speech for good reasons. See 
Adler, supra, at 19-26; Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, supra, at 736-44; see also 
Richard H. Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 312-15 
(2000) [hereinafter Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights] (exploring Dworkin’s 
views); Jeremy Waldron, Pildes on Dworkin’s Theory of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 301, 
302-07 (2000) (exploring Dworkin’s views also). 
 26. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda 
v. Arizona1), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 10 (2010) (“When the Justices fail to extend a precedent as the 
logic of its rationale would require, that is one form of stealth overruling.”); see also 
Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 1862-
63 (2014) (referring to this practice as “narrowing”). 
 27. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).  
 28. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).  
 29. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).  
 30. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). For an argument that the “general logic of compelled support 
doctrine” is grounded in the reasoning of Buckley and Abood, see Micah Schwartzman, 
Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REV. 317, 380 & n.203 (2011). My assessment of 
compelled-subsidy doctrine appears in Part III.C. 
 31. See Dorf, supra note 15, at 1210; Stone, supra note 15, at 112-14. 
 32. A burgeoning set of cases and articles addresses this issue. See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 
F.3d 78, 79-82 (1st Cir. 2011); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 260-62 (3d Cir. 
2010); Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 78, 81-83 (2014); Seth F. 
Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the 
Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 337-39, 367-69, 386-87 (2011); Howard M. 
footnote continued on next page 
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In sum, reexamining the Supreme Court’s approach to speech-facilitating 
conduct offers fresh insights on a broad swath of free speech law. Part I begins 
this effort by explaining the terms and categories that guide current free speech 
doctrine. Part II turns to the pre-Arcara cases, showing that the Supreme Court 
gave broad recognition to incidental-burden claims across a wide array of free 
speech cases, even when laws did not target speech. This Part focuses on major 
decisions relating to information gathering, campaign finance, compelled 
subsidies, and associational rights. 
Arcara and its progeny are examined in Part III. Two features, I argue, 
define these cases. First, the government faces a heightened burden when it 
singles out speech. This principle is relatively uncontroversial,33 but this 
Article helps to explain its proper scope, particularly in Part IV. A law that 
targets conduct closely related to speech—singling out newsprint for a special 
tax, for instance—raises a First Amendment problem even if it does not target 
the expressive end product. But while free speech doctrine is structured in part 
to combat improper governmental motives, the anti-targeting approach 
focuses on what the relevant law does, and not what actually motivated 
legislators.34 Second, and more controversially, regulations of nonexpressive 
conduct do not raise free speech problems when the government does not 
target speech. In short, the First Amendment does not provide an “affirmative” 
right to engage in speech-facilitating conduct. Rather, coverage for speech-
facilitating conduct is “negative,” protecting against targeted governmental 
interference with the speech process.35  
This framework suggests that selective enforcement of general rules could 
create a First Amendment problem.36 Nonetheless, this Article focuses solely 
on challenges to legal rules and leaves enforcement questions for another day. 
Critically, however, by viewing free speech rights in this area as a bar against 
certain governmental actions rather than as a shield around particular 
conduct,37 the anti-targeting framework rejects “as applied” First Amendment 
 
Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. 
REV. 600, 652-57 (2009). 
 33. But see United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 490 (1995) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting) (“The ban neither prohibits anyone from speaking or writing, nor does 
it penalize anyone who speaks or writes; the only stricture effected by the statute is a 
denial of compensation.”). 
 34. See infra Part IV.A. 
 35. The distinction between “affirmative” and “negative” conceptions of rights is common. 
See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 15, at 782-83; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom 
of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 155-56 (2010); see also infra notes 70-73 and 
accompanying text.  
 36. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972); LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A 
RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 38-39 (2005); Srinivasan, supra note 15, at 416.  
 37. See Adler, supra note 25, at 16 (employing this terminology).  
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challenges to general laws neutrally applied to nonexpressive conduct.38 (This 
Article, however, does not challenge the viability of “as applied” claims when 
the restricted conduct is expressive.)39 
The anti-targeting principle makes sense of Supreme Court holdings that 
others have described as “remarkably erratic and fragmented.”40 In doing so, it 
answers several looming First Amendment questions, including how to 
evaluate free speech claims involving incidental burdens on expressive 
associations, compelled subsidies for speech (e.g., bar dues and union-shop 
dues), and putative newsgathering privileges for journalists. To flesh out how 
the anti-targeting principle operates, Part IV considers its application to 
restrictions on audiovisual recording—one of the most interesting emerging 
issues in free speech law. 
Beyond its historical and doctrinal arguments, this Article concludes in 
Part V by sketching a brief normative defense of the anti-targeting approach. 
That defense begins with the common recognition that values undergirding 
the First Amendment readily support some measure of constitutional 
protection for speech-facilitating conduct. But unlike most of its counterparts, 
the anti-targeting framework eschews case-by-case balancing or doctrinal tests 
that vary by speaker or subject. It further avoids assessments of the 
“significance” of incidental burdens, or other questions that might depend on 
cumbersome and indeterminate empirical inquiries. When it comes to 
nonexpressive conduct, anti-targeting thus provides a doctrinal framework 
that is more stable and predictable than its alternatives. Though all approaches 
involve tradeoffs, focusing doctrine on laws rather than individual expressive 
purposes adequately accounts for speech interests and concerns of judicial 
economy.  
 
 38. Cf. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1994) (determining that 
an injunction applied to abortion protestors did not target their viewpoint because 
“[a]n injunction, by its very nature, applies . . . . in the context of a specific dispute”); 
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1986) (applying no First Amendment 
scrutiny to review a judicial order closing a bookstore because the applicable law was 
neutral and generally applicable). 
 39. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 40. McDonald, supra note 7, at 251. McDonald’s comment relates to newsgathering cases, 
but his criticism is common regarding other types of speech-facilitating conduct. See, 
e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan & Robert C. Post, Colloquy, It’s What’s for Lunch: Nectarines, 
Mushrooms, and Beef—The First Amendment and Compelled Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 359, 365-67 (2007) (statement of Kathleen M. Sullivan) (describing “doctrinal 
instability and incoherence” in compelled-subsidy doctrine). 
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I. Basic Principles 
A. Expressive and Nonexpressive Conduct 
“First Amendment law,” a prominent commentator explains, “view[s] 
expressive and nonexpressive activity as meaningfully different, even though 
drawing a line between the two raises hard questions.”41 Writing and speaking 
are, of course, quintessential “speech,” but the First Amendment also provides 
qualified protection to a wide array of “expressive conduct,” including so-called 
“symbolic speech.”42 Burning flags, wearing black armbands, participating in a 
parade, and even dancing in the nude are well-known examples.43 To 
determine whether conduct is expressive, courts ask whether the conduct is 
“imbued with elements of communication.”44 Expressive conduct need not 
convey “a narrow, succinctly articulable message,”45 but mere intent to 
communicate an idea or feeling is insufficient.46  
Generally speaking, regulations of expressive conduct “bring the First 
Amendment into play,” even when that conduct is circumscribed by a law 
having nothing to do with speech.47 This Article—which emphasizes laws 
rather than conduct when it comes to nonexpressive acts—does not challenge the 
 
 41. Kagan, supra note 15, at 491 n.207. For criticism of the division between speech and 
conduct as “notoriously problematic,” see Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: 
Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 855-56 
(2012). For the necessity of distinguishing between expressive and nonexpressive 
activity, notwithstanding the difficulties, see Louis Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 
Term—Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 79-80 (1968); Elena Kagan, 
Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography After R.A.V., 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 873, 884 (1993); 
and Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An Exercise in the 
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 902 (1979). 
 42. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 43. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 
568-70 (1995) (parade); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality 
opinion) (nude dancing); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989) (flag burning); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (black arm 
band). 
 44. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam). 
 45. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569; see also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 
294 (1984) (“[A] message may be delivered by conduct that is intended to be 
communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the viewer to 
be communicative.”). 
 46. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (disclaiming that “an apparently limitless variety of conduct can 
be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to 
express an idea”); see also Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 n.5 (“[T]he person desiring to engage in 
assertedly expressive conduct [must] demonstrate that the First Amendment even 
applies.”). 
 47. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404; see also id. at 403 (“We must first determine whether Johnson’s 
burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First 
Amendment in challenging his conviction.”).  
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general rule that restrictions of expressive acts trigger the First Amendment, 
regardless of the law at issue.48 Applying a breach-of-the-peace statute to a 
rowdy protestor, for instance, implicates free speech principles even though 
the statute does not single out expression. The First Amendment, in other 
words, usually “covers” expressive conduct,49 meaning that whenever a law 
incidentally regulates expressive conduct, courts apply some form of elevated 
judicial scrutiny.50  
But what happens when the incidence of a law falls on nonexpressive 
conduct? Suppose a journalist needs to eavesdrop on a source to complete an 
exposé. Or a scientist needs to circumvent a ban on destroying embryonic stem 
cells to create a publishable article. Or a photographer takes photographs 
without obeying state privacy laws. How should courts decide whether to 
apply some form of elevated scrutiny to these restrictions of nonexpressive 
conduct? 
 
 48. Descriptively, this distinction reflects current law; the First Amendment treats 
expressive and nonexpressive conduct differently for purposes of coverage. 
Normatively, Part V offers some reasons why that distinction makes sense.  
 49. For the standard work on “coverage” and “protection,” see Frederick Schauer, Categories 
and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270 (1981). 
 50. When a law directly burdens expressive conduct, the Supreme Court considers, but 
does not give talismanic importance to, whether the law targets expression. Here are 
the basics: if the expressive aspect of conduct triggers a legal restriction, the Supreme 
Court generally evaluates governmental interests “under a more demanding standard.” 
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403. If the law or a particular application is content based, the Court 
generally applies “the most exacting scrutiny.” Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 
U.S., 312, 321 (1988)); see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27-28 (2010). 
Meanwhile, content-neutral laws that target expressive conduct usually receive 
intermediate scrutiny. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). But 
even when the expressive aspect of conduct does not trigger the regulation, the Court 
still uses a variant of intermediate scrutiny known as the O’Brien test to consider 
whether particular applications of general laws comport with the First Amendment. See 
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion) (endorsing “the 
framework set forth in O’Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech”); 
id. at 310 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the 
plurality’s approach). 
  Scholars have disputed the extent to which expression triggers heightened scrutiny. 
Compare Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 
1250-60 (1995) (challenging the idea that expression triggers heightened review),        
and Schauer, supra note 19, at 1771 (describing “countless . . . instances” where 
communicative acts are “not measured against First Amendment-generated standards”), 
with Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1105-06 (2005) 
(favoring First Amendment coverage for communicative acts that facilitate crime), and 
Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, 
“Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1347 
(2005) [hereinafter, Volokh, Speech as Conduct] (“When the law restricts speech because 
of what the speech communicates—because the speech causes harms by persuading, 
informing, or offending—we shouldn’t deny that the law is a speech restriction, and 
requires some serious justification.”). 
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B. Doctrinal Possibilities 
Approaches to coverage for speech-facilitating conduct generally fall on a 
continuum that focuses on the speaker, not the government.51 At one pole, free 
speech coverage is denied for all claims involving nonexpressive conduct 
regardless of expressive aims or indirect effects on speech.52 A limitation on 
giving money to an expressive group, for instance, would not raise a First 
Amendment problem unless the act of giving money counted as “expressive.” 
Some cases suggest this approach. “[A]lthough the Supreme Court has defined 
the boundaries of expression broadly,” one Court of Appeals has opined, “it 
never has extended the protections of the First Amendment to non-expressive 
conduct.”53 At this pole, the distinction between expressive and non-expressive 
conduct is absolutely crucial; restrictions of nonexpressive conduct do not 
implicate the First Amendment at all.  
At the other pole, heightened First Amendment scrutiny applies whenever 
a regulation of nonexpressive conduct burdens an expressive goal—most 
commonly when someone wants to engage in nonexpressive conduct for an 
expressive reason.54 On this view, a limitation on giving money to an 
expressive group would raise a free speech problem by diminishing the supply 
of money used for speech. At this pole, the distinction between expressive and 
nonexpressive conduct is less important, and the scope of First Amendment 
 
 51. This Article is not the first to offer a taxonomy of approaches to this problem. 
Particularly useful, in my view, is Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First 
Amendment Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1291, 1297-99, 1337-44 (2004). 
 52. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing the Rights of Privacy and the Press: A Reply to 
Professor Smolla, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1152, 1156 (1999) (“[A] general law restricting 
behavior is not vulnerable to a First Amendment challenge based on its impact in 
restricting the gathering of information.”); Gary L. Francione, Experimentation and     
the Marketplace Theory of the First Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 483 (1987) (“[T]he 
first amendment does not generally protect noncommunicative preconditions of           
speech . . . .”); Dana Remus Irwin, Freedom of Thought: The First Amendment and the 
Scientific Method, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1479, 1504 [hereinafter Remus, Freedom of Thought] 
(“[A]bsent very specific exceptions, the Court has never construed general 
noncommunicative preconditions of speech as indispensable conditions of free 
expression.”); Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1187 (2005) (“[N]o case recognizes a First Amendment investigative 
privilege that provides immunity from generally applicable property and tort rules 
like trespass.”); Dina Mishra, Comment, Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police: Citizen 
Tape Recording to Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549, 1550 (2008) (“[T]he First 
Amendment protects individuals . . . who distribute recordings of illegal police conduct. 
But it probably does not protect individuals . . . who produce the recordings.”). These 
works do not reject the idea of heightened scrutiny for speech-targeted laws, but their 
focus is on individual conduct rather than on laws.   
 53. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 54. Cf. John A. Robertson, The Scientist’s Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51           
S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1217-18 (1977) (“If the first amendment serves to protect free trade 
in the dissemination of ideas and information, it must also protect the necessary 
preconditions of speech . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
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coverage is extraordinarily broad. Tax laws, environmental standards, and 
labor laws, for instance, all routinely impose costs that could have derivative 
effects on the supply of speech. 
Not surprisingly, most scholarly accounts fall somewhere between these 
extremes. Scholars who advocate First Amendment coverage for 
nonexpressive conduct based on the effects on speech usually craft limiting 
principles, lest expressive purposes trigger heightened review of nearly any 
law.55  
The most frequent proposals define First Amendment boundaries by 
subject, asking what expressive goal is at stake. Scholars have debated an array 
of possibilities. Subject-specific First Amendment rights could include a right 
to gather news (which facilitates publishing news),56 a right to give money to 
political campaigns (which facilitates political speech),57 a right to be free from 
compelled giving (which otherwise facilitates undesired speech),58 and a right 
to engage in scientific research (which facilitates publishing scientific 
articles).59 These categories could be further delineated—limiting information-
gathering claims, for example, to instances where the desired information is of 
public rather than private concern.60 
 
 55. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 7, at 327.  
 56. See, e.g., id. at 273-308, 327. Other key pieces in this voluminous literature include 
Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
927, 938-39 (1992); RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter’s Privilege, 111 MICH. L. 
REV. 1221, 1223-25 (2013); Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to 
Gather News, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1097 (1999); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, I Spy: The 
Newsgatherer Under Cover, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1185, 1197-1200 (2000); Diane L. 
Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock: Estes Revisited, or a Modest Proposal for the 
Constitutional Protection of the News-Gathering Process, 1980 DUKE L.J. 641, 646-48. 
 57. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and 
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1054 (1985) (favoring First 
Amendment protection for campaign contributions because “[t]hose who give to and 
spend on election campaigns are intrinsically legitimate participants in the ongoing 
process of representative democracy”). For other discussions of free speech rights in the 
context of campaign contribution limits, see McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 
(2014); Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 
(2011); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318-19 (2010); and Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 665-67 (1997). 
 58. See, e.g., Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing 
Association, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 202-03. Micah Schwartzman notes the logical 
relationship between laws that limit contributions and those that compel 
contributions. See Schwartzman, supra note 30, at 381-82. 
 59. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 54, at 1217 (“As an essential step in the process of 
dissemination of ideas and information, research should have the same constitutional 
status as dissemination itself.”). Other contributions to this literature include James R. 
Ferguson, Scientific Inquiry and the First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 639 (1979); and 
Barry P. McDonald, Government Regulation or Other “Abridgments” of Scientific Research: 
The Proper Scope of Judicial Review Under the First Amendment, 54 EMORY L.J. 979 (2005). 
 60. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 7, at 338 n.301 (proposing a “news value” test). 
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Other proposals seek to limit who gets First Amendment protection. News-
reporting privileges, for instance, might be confined to journalists.61 Coverage 
could similarly depend on where the nonexpressive conduct takes place,62 or on 
the degree to which the regulations burden certain speakers.63 Geoffrey Stone 
and Michael Dorf both argue that significant incidental burdens on speech 
ought to trigger elevated scrutiny.64 Finally, many scholars assert that First 
Amendment interests should give way when the rights of others are 
infringed.65 
Speaker-focused approaches rest on the familiar distinction between 
protected and unprotected conduct—the idea that some conduct is constitutionally 
privileged, while other conduct is not.66 That distinction reflects how we 
typically talk about rights,67 and it fits with a commonsense understanding 
that rights protect individuals. “From the perspective of a rightholder,” Dorf 
points out, “the severity of a law’s impact has no necessary connection to 
whether the law directly or incidentally burdens the right’s exercise.”68 In 
other words, usually people care most about whether their actions are lawful, 
not why they might be unlawful. Modern substantive due process doctrine 
seems to exemplify this way of thinking about rights as protecting certain 
types of conduct against governmental infringement.69 And, as explained in 
Part II, the Supreme Court focused on protection for certain types of conduct 
in many of its decisions prior to the mid-1980s. 
But speech rights do not have to fall on this speaker-focused continuum. 
The First Amendment could instead “direct our attention to the law rather than 
to the conduct prohibited by a particular application.”70 Indeed, as Matthew 
 
 61. See Jones, supra note 56, at 1239 (“By its very designation, a constitutional reporter’s 
privilege applies only to a ‘reporter,’ and thus mandates a threshold showing that the 
party seeking the constitutional protection qualifies occupationally for the privilege.”); 
see also Developments in the Law—The Law of Media, 120 HARV. L. REV. 990, 996-98 (2007) 
(discussing various statutory and constitutional approaches for privileging journalist 
activities). 
 62. For instance, the First Amendment might afford special solicitude for expression-
related conduct that takes place in public fora or other public places. See Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 599-600 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 63. See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text. 
 64. See Dorf, supra note 15, at 1210; Stone, supra note 15, at 112-14. 
 65. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 54, at 1206. This limiting principle could be used to 
determine “coverage” or “protection,” or both. 
 66. See, e.g., id. at 1204 (asking whether scientists “have a legal right to conduct research”). 
 67. Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights, supra note 25, at 311 (“I believe [a conduct-
based view] is the dominant view of rights in the contemporary political culture 
(though I do not know how one would prove that).”). 
 68. Dorf, supra note 15, at 1177. 
 69. See id. at 1219-21. 
 70. Id. at 1185-86; see also Samaha, supra note 51, at 1294. 
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Adler observes, many constitutional rights—including some free speech 
rights—“function not as shields around particular actions, but as shields against 
particular rules.”71 The Supreme Court has mostly adopted that view of the 
Free Exercise Clause, holding that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an 
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general 
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that 
his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”72 Individuals, in other words, cannot 
obtain constitutional exemptions when laws happen to conflict with their 
religious beliefs and practices; the “right” of free exercise is a rule about rules, 
not a shield around particular behavior. Justice Scalia has advocated (without 
success) for an analogous principle in free speech cases, proposing that 
heightened scrutiny should be limited to situations “[w]here the government 
prohibits conduct precisely because of its communicative attributes.”73  
C. Anti-Targeting 
How would a focus on laws rather than conduct work in the context of 
restrictions of speech-facilitating conduct? This question is explored in greater 
depth in Parts III and IV, which argue that the Supreme Court now uses a law-
focused approach to assess regulations of nonexpressive conduct. But it is 
useful to offer a preliminary sketch. In short, a law-focused approach can be 
based on an anti-targeting concept. Laws regulating nonexpressive conduct 
raise free speech concerns when those laws single out speech—including 
speech-related rules that target the speech process. At the same time, however, 
the speech-restrictive effects of general (i.e., nontargeted) laws do not trigger 
heightened scrutiny when those laws are neutrally applied to regulate 
nonexpressive conduct. 
In most cases, applying the anti-targeting principle is straightforward. For 
example, riding a public subway is not expressive, and therefore standard 
metro hours are immune from a First Amendment challenge. If a late-night 
 
 71. Adler, supra note 25, at 16 (emphasis added); see also Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, 
supra note 25, at 730-31 (articulating a similar “structural” account of rights).  
 72. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 
263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). But see Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012) (holding that 
religious institutions are sometimes constitutionally exempt from neutral, generally 
applicable labor laws). 
 73. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 577 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (emphasis omitted). Justice Scalia has advocated for an overarching 
framework that treats the structure of free exercise and free speech claims alike. See id. 
at 579; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (asserting, perhaps inaccurately, that “generally 
applicable laws unconcerned with regulating speech that have the effect of interfering 
with speech do not thereby become subject to compelling-interest analysis under the 
First Amendment”). This Article makes a more limited argument. See supra notes 39, 48 
and accompanying text. 
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protestor insisted that a public subway extend its usual hours of operation for 
his convenience, he and his free speech argument would get nowhere. An 
ordinance barring the use of the subway to attend protests, however, would 
raise clear First Amendment problems.74 
Still, targeting could be defined in different ways. The concept could refer, 
for instance, to the subjective intentions of governmental actors, asking 
whether they are motivated by speech-related effects. Targeting could also 
refer to whether the law, evaluated objectively on its face, singles out speech.75 
For purposes of this Article, targeting refers to an objective concept, thus 
avoiding unwieldy inquiries into subjective intentions and maintaining greater 
consistency with current law across a wide array of constitutional doctrines.76 
At the same time, however, the anti-targeting principle bars not only laws that 
facially single out speech but also laws that, evaluated contextually, have an 
apparent disproportionate effect on speech. This caveat, common in other 
areas of constitutional law, helps avoid the common problem of 
“gerrymandering.” A special tax on newsprint, for instance, would facially 
target only a particular type of printing paper—not expression itself—but its 
disproportionate effects on expression would be facially apparent.  
Readers might wonder how the anti-targeting framework—which 
accounts for a law’s anticipated effects—differs from a speaker-focused approach 
that applies heightened scrutiny based on indirect effects on speech. The 
answer is that the anti-targeting framework focuses on laws rather than on 
individuals. A speaker-focused approach allows for free speech exemptions 
when otherwise valid laws happen to burden speech. A proponent of this view, 
for instance, might argue that journalists should sometimes be allowed to 
disregard general laws, or that newspapers should be able to hire low-cost 
teenagers to deliver papers notwithstanding child labor laws. The anti-
targeting approach, by contrast, rejects the idea of exemptions from general 
laws when the restriction falls on nonexpressive conduct. Instead, the anti-
targeting principle focuses on whether the relevant law targets speech either 
on its face or by targeting conduct that is closely related to speech.77 
Deciding whether a law has an apparent disproportionate effect on speech 
will sometimes be difficult. Part IV explores this challenge in greater detail, but 
 
 74. This scenario is expropriated from Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens 
United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 421 (2013).  
 75. Of course, objective tests often serve as administrable proxies for assessing subjective 
motives. See John Hart Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1155, 1156 (1978).   
 76. See infra Part IV.A.  
 77. Again, my only concern in this Article is First Amendment coverage. “Questions about 
the boundaries of the First Amendment are not questions of strength—the degree of 
protection that the First Amendment offers—but rather are questions of scope—
whether the First Amendment applies at all.” Schauer, supra note 19, at 1771. 
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it is worth emphasizing up front that this Article eschews any claim to clarity 
in all cases. Close questions are inevitable, and some ambiguity in this area may 
even be a benefit, allowing doctrine to develop over time as judges confront 
real cases. Importantly, however, a focus on laws rather than on individual 
conduct provides substantial predictability for speakers—giving precedents a 
well-defined effect (i.e., laws are either constitutional or not), while moving 
doctrine away from a rigid reliance on the speech/conduct distinction.78 Part V 
offers a normative defense of anti-targeting and takes a closer look at its 
challenges and tradeoffs, but for now we can return to a brief sketch of the 
concept. 
Laws that single out nonexpressive acts undertaken for an expressive 
purpose present the clearest example of targeting. Consider the example 
mentioned above: an ordinance barring use of public subways to attend a 
protest. Ordinary travel on a subway is not expressive, but the ordinance raises 
free speech concerns because it singles out speech activities for particular 
disadvantage. The same issue arises even if the incidence of the law does not fall 
directly on conduct that facilitates speech. An ordinance barring subway use by 
groups of speakers—journalists or lobbyists, for example—would not directly 
target speech-facilitating conduct, but it would nonetheless target speech by 
using a speech-related rule. 
These hypothetical ordinances could be viewed as direct regulations of 
speech under the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine.79 But the anti-
targeting principle applies even when that characterization is unwarranted. 
Consider, for instance, campaign contribution caps. Assuming that campaign 
donations facilitate speech but are not themselves expressive acts, campaign 
contribution ceilings do not directly burden expressive conduct. Nonetheless, 
contribution caps plainly target speech-facilitating conduct by singling out 
donations used for campaigning.80 Compelled monetary transfers that are 
designed to fund someone else’s speech present a similar problem.81 As these 
examples illustrate, the anti-targeting principle ensures that the government 
stays presumptively neutral not only toward speech acts and speakers but also 
 
 78. The anti-targeting approach uses the speech/conduct distinction, too, but it reduces 
reliance on that distinction by applying heightened scrutiny in many cases where the 
regulated conduct is nonexpressive. 
 79. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine generally prohibits the government from 
requiring “a person to give up a constitutional right . . . in exchange for a discretionary 
benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no 
relationship” to the regulated right. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). 
 80. Even accepting Justice White’s point that “many expensive campaign activities . . . are 
not themselves communicative or remotely related to speech,” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 263 (1976) (per curiam) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 
campaign contribution limits could still trigger heightened scrutiny because they 
target campaigns, whose mission is expressive. 
 81. See infra Part III.C. 
Speech-Facilitating Conduct 
68 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2016) 
18 
toward “conduct commonly associated with expression.”82 This idea—as       
Part IV argues—calls for heightened scrutiny when laws target conventional 
means of expression (that is, objects conventionally used for expressive 
reasons), such as phones, televisions, computers, printers, and so forth.83 
II. Before Arcara 
In order to understand current doctrine, we need to appreciate how the 
Supreme Court’s approach has evolved. This Part, which explores the Court’s 
treatment of speech-facilitating conduct prior to its 1986 decision in Arcara, 
focuses on four lines of cases: (1) information-gathering cases; (2) campaign 
finance law; (3) compelled-subsidy doctrine; and (4) associational rights. Part III 
then reevaluates each of these areas, exposing dramatic changes in the Court’s 
jurisprudence along with confusion sown by the Court’s failure to identify or 
grapple with those shifts. 
A. Information Gathering 
Information-gathering cases arise when someone asserts a qualified right 
to gather information—often “newsworthy” information—for use in 
subsequent expressive acts.84 Prior to the mid-1980s, the outcomes in 
information-gathering cases were consistent with the anti-targeting principle, 
but the Supreme Court’s reasoning sometimes revealed an approach that let 
indirect effects on speech trigger First Amendment coverage.  
Information-gathering claims had a rocky start. In Zemel v. Rusk—a free 
speech challenge to the Cuba travel embargo—the Court flatly denied that “a 
First Amendment right . . . [was] involved” in merely gathering information.85 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren explained:  
[T]he Secretary’s refusal to validate passports for Cuba . . . is an inhibition of 
action. There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by 
 
 82. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759-61 (1988). The Court in 
Lakewood decided to allow a facial challenge to a licensing scheme because the 
regulation was not a general law but instead was “aimed at conduct commonly 
associated with expression.” Id. at 760-61. 
 83. Uses of expressive media—such as radio, music, and film—to disseminate audiovisual 
content would usually count as “expressive” without resort to doctrines relating to 
nonexpressive conduct. See, e.g., Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589 
(1954) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Motion pictures are of course a different 
medium of expression than the public speech, the radio, the stage, the novel, or the 
magazine. But the First Amendment draws no distinction between the various methods 
of communicating ideas.”); see also Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948) (“Loud-
speakers are today indispensable instruments of effective public speech.”). 
 84. The legal concept of “newsworthiness” typically refers to information “of legitimate 
public concern.” See, e.g., Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 85. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). 
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ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the 
prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen’s 
opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the 
way the country is being run, but that does not make entry into the White House 
a First Amendment right. The right to speak and publish does not carry with it 
the unrestrained right to gather information.86 
Importantly, the Court noted that the restriction on travel had not “result[ed] 
from any expression or association.”87 The travel restriction, in other words, 
did not target speech.  
Several years later in Branzburg v. Hayes,88 however, the Supreme Court 
seemed more receptive to the possibility of constitutional protection for 
newsgathering. Branzburg involved journalists who objected to testifying about 
their confidential sources. Revealing this information to grand juries, they 
argued, would deter their sources “from furnishing publishable information, all 
to the detriment of the free flow of information protected by the First 
Amendment.”89 
For the most part, the Court squarely rejected the journalists’ claims.90 
Though acknowledging that “without some protection for seeking out the 
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,”91 the five-Justice majority 
was acutely concerned with the potential breadth of newsgathering rights. “It is 
clear,” Justice White wrote for the majority, “that the First Amendment does 
not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the 
enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability.”92 Pointing to 
Zemel v. Rusk, he observed that “the First Amendment does not guarantee the 
press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the 
public generally,”93 and that it would be “frivolous” to claim a constitutional 
right to violate otherwise valid criminal laws.94 “Although stealing documents 
or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy information,” Justice White 
 
 86. Id. at 16-17. 
 87. Id. at 16. 
 88. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).  
 89. Id. at 679-80. Specifically, they argued that journalists generally should not have to 
testify about confidential sources unless the government is able to show that the 
information is relevant and otherwise unavailable, and that “the need for the 
information is sufficiently compelling to override the claimed invasion of First 
Amendment interests occasioned by the disclosure.” Id. at 680. 
 90. Id. at 690 (“We are asked to . . . interpret[] the First Amendment to grant newsmen a 
testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy. This we decline to do.”). 
 91. Id. at 681. 
 92. Id. at 682. 
 93. Id. at 684. 
 94. Id. at 691. 
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explained, “neither reporter nor source is immune from conviction for such 
conduct, whatever the impact on the flow of news.”95  
Yet the Branzburg decision is frustratingly ambiguous. To begin with, the 
Court framed its discussion by observing that “a State’s interest must be 
‘compelling’ or ‘paramount’ to justify even an indirect burden on First 
Amendment rights.”96 It then proceeded to apply elevated scrutiny. “On the 
records now before us,” the Court remarked—intimating a possible limitation 
on its holding—there was “no basis” for giving constitutional priority to 
journalists based on a “consequential, but uncertain, burden on news 
gathering.”97 The effect of subpoenas on newsgathering was “unclear” and “to a 
great extent speculative,” producing “widely divergent” estimates.98 Worried 
about where recognition of journalist privileges might lead, the majority 
cautioned that it was “unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult 
journey to such an uncertain destination.”99 With more clarity about the 
speech effects of reporter subpoenas, however, perhaps the Court’s conclusion 
would have changed.  
Justice Powell—one of the five Justices who joined the majority opinion—
wrote a short concurrence. A claimed privilege, he emphasized, “should be 
judged on its facts,” balancing governmental interests against the freedom of 
the press.100 “The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on 
a case-by-case basis,” he argued, “accords with the tried and traditional way of 
adjudicating such questions.”101 
No wonder lower courts were thoroughly confused by Branzburg. The 
majority had rejected the asserted privilege, seemingly in categorical terms. But 
the Court nonetheless applied heightened scrutiny, and Justice Powell’s 
“enigmatic” concurrence—as the dissenting Justices put it102—provided further 
hope to proponents of a reporter’s privilege. Following the decision, many 
lower courts read the unusual combination of opinions as supporting the 
availability of a reporter’s privilege in certain cases.103 
 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 700. 
 97. Id. at 690-91. 
 98. Id. at 693-94. 
 99. Id. at 703. 
 100. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Powell continued to adhere to this view of 
Branzburg in his later writings. See Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 859-60 (1974) 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (“[A] fair reading of the majority’s analysis in Branzburg makes 
plain that the result hinged on an assessment of the competing societal interests 
involved in that case rather than on any determination that First Amendment 
freedoms were not implicated.”). 
 103. See, e.g., In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1982); Bruno & 
Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 594-96 (1st Cir. 1980).  
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Subsequent information-gathering cases ventured down the same trail. 
The Court, for the most part, steadfastly rejected case-specific exemptions. But 
the Justices often applied some form of heightened scrutiny to determine 
whether certain categories of speech-related conduct should be constitutionally 
protected. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, for instance, the Court acknowledged that 
the First Amendment was “implicated” by the application of a travel restriction 
that barred a communist from entering the country to speak at an academic 
conference.104 Like in Branzburg, however, the Court nevertheless rejected the 
asserted right because it “would prove too much.”105 Were courts to recognize 
such a right, either “every claim would prevail,” thus nullifying the travel 
restriction, or “courts in each case would be required to weigh the strength of 
the audience’s interest against that of the Government in refusing a waiver to 
the particular alien applicant, according to some as yet undetermined 
standard.”106  
A series of “access” cases raised the same concern, reflecting continued 
divisions about how to approach speech-facilitating conduct.107 In Houchins v. 
KQED, Inc.,108 for instance, the Court split over whether journalists should be 
exempt from certain prison visitation rules. The plurality opinion of Chief 
Justice Burger firmly rejected the journalists’ First Amendment claim, 
explaining that it would require judges “to fashion ad hoc standards, in 
individual cases, according to their own ideas of what seems ‘desirable’ or 
‘expedient.’”109 A constitutional interest was at stake, he acknowledged, but this 
interest did not justify a First Amendment right to nonpublic information. 
“The public’s interest in knowing about its government is protected by the 
guarantee of a Free Press,” the Chief explained, “but the protection is indirect. 
The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official 
Secrets Act.”110 Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and 
 
 104. 408 U.S. 753, 755-56, 765 (1972). 
 105. Id. at 768. 
 106. Id. at 768-69. The Supreme Court employed similar arguments to reject a claim that 
“education is itself a fundamental personal right because it is essential to the effective 
exercise of First Amendment freedoms.” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 35 (1973). Although acknowledging that education promotes “a system of 
freedom of expression,” the Court held that this effect does not warrant “judicial 
intrusion,” the “logical limitations” of which are “difficult to perceive.” Id. at 36-37. 
 107. See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-35 (1974). 
 108. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
 109. Id. at 14 (plurality opinion). 
 110. Id. (quoting Potter Stewart, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, “Or of the Press,” 
Address at the Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation (Nov. 2, 1974), in 26 
HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975)). Justice Stewart agreed with the plurality’s premise that 
the Constitution does not grant journalists access to nonpublic information, but he 
argued that the press—as a constitutionally privileged conduit for public information—
should be granted a few special privileges (like being allowed to use recording 
footnote continued on next page 
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Powell. “Without some protection for the acquisition of information about the 
operation of public institutions,” they claimed, “the process of self-governance 
contemplated by the Framers would be stripped of its substance.”111  
The contours of doctrine were thus heavily contested as the Supreme 
Court entered the 1980s. Although the Court had consistently rejected 
information-gathering claims, the shifting majorities, pluralities, and 
concurring opinions varied in their approaches to threshold questions. Most 
importantly, the Justices remained divided about whether First Amendment 
coverage should depend on the distinction between expressive and 
nonexpressive conduct. 
The Court’s first putative recognition of an information-gathering right 
came in a pair of access decisions in the early 1980s addressing whether the 
closure of a criminal courtroom abridges the freedom of speech. Justice 
Brennan’s view, which the Court adopted in 1982, deserves the most attention. 
“Read with care and in context,” Justice Brennan wrote in Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, prior cases indicated that “access to governmental 
information is subject to a degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the 
information and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality.”112 
Interestingly, however, Justice Brennan did not locate an access right in the 
First Amendment’s ordinary guarantee “to protect communication between 
speaker and listener.”113 “[T]he First Amendment,” he explained, “embodies 
more than a commitment to free expression and communicative interchange 
for their own sakes; it has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our 
republican system of self-government.”114 This structural component, he 
insisted, “links the First Amendment to that process of communication 
necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails solicitude not only for 
communication itself, but also for the indispensable conditions of meaningful 
communication.”115 
Justice Brennan recognized the practical challenges of applying First 
Amendment protection to nonexpressive conduct that facilitates speech. “[T]he 
stretch of this protection is theoretically endless,” he acknowledged, and 
 
equipment) to facilitate more effective performance of their constitutionally respected 
role. Id. at 16-18 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 111. Id. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 112. 448 U.S. 555, 586 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Prior decisions, 
Justice Brennan continued, “neither comprehensively nor absolutely deny that public 
access to information may at times be implied by the First Amendment and the 
principles which animate it.” Id. 
 113. Id. at 586-87. 
 114. Id. at 587. 
 115. Id. at 588. 
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therefore “must be invoked with discrimination and temperance.”116 At first 
glance, he seemed to endorse a case-by-case balancing test, “considering the 
information sought and the opposing interests invaded.”117 Yet he tethered this 
open-ended statement to two sturdier principles. Consideration of “public 
access claims in individual cases,” he wrote, “must be strongly influenced by the 
weight of historical practice and by an assessment of the specific structural 
value of public access in the circumstances.”118 Using these historical and 
structural guideposts, Justice Brennan concluded that the Constitution 
presumptively guarantees a public right of access to criminal trials.119 Thus, as 
late as the early 1980s, the Court was still willing to recognize a speech right 
based on the incidental effects of a general rule.  
B. Campaign Contributions 
Governmental restrictions on contributions to political campaigns raise a 
similar concern about coverage for speech-facilitating conduct, and not merely 
for the expressive end product.  
In the watershed case of Buckley v. Valeo,120 the Supreme Court famously 
distinguished between limits on how much money campaigns may spend and 
limits on how much money individuals may contribute. Restrictions on 
campaign expenditures, the Court held, were essentially restrictions on speech 
itself.121 But contributions were less protected by the First Amendment, thus 
triggering a lower level of scrutiny.122 
For purposes of this Article, the pivotal question is why campaign 
contribution limits implicate the First Amendment at all. The Buckley opinion 
offers two possibilities. First, contributions to political candidates “may result 
in political expression . . . by someone other than the contributor.”123 In other 
words, contributions are covered by the First Amendment because they 
facilitate speech. Second, the Court seems to have recognized that campaign 
contributions might be expressive. “A contribution serves as a general 
 
 116. Id. (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address at the 
Dedication for the S.I. Newhouse Center for Law and Justice (Oct. 17, 1979), in 32 
RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 177 (1979)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 597-98. 
 119. Id. at 589-97. The Court explicitly adopted this framework two years later. See Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605-06 (1982). 
 120. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 121. Id. at 16-17. 
 122. Id. at 20-23. 
 123. Id. at 21.  
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expression of support for the candidate and his views,” the Court explained, 
“but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support.”124 
This Article takes no position on whether campaign contributions are 
sufficiently expressive to count as “speech” under the First Amendment—an 
issue that strikes me as mostly an irrelevant distraction.125 Supreme Court 
opinions and scholarly discussions point in both directions.126  
For present purposes, the key point is that Buckley focused on the effects of 
contributions. To be sure, the Court described contributing as a “general 
expression of support” and a “symbolic act,”127 but these comments were made 
to disparage the expressive value of the contributions. Buckley, we must 
remember, came at a time when the speech/conduct distinction was still being 
worked out and did not yet have threshold doctrinal significance. Thus, as 
Kathleen Sullivan aptly explains, the doctrinally relevant point in Buckley was 
that monetary contributions are conduct that “merely facilitate[s] or 
associate[s] the contributor with speech,” whereas individual expenditures “are 
more directly expressive.”128 In this way, Buckley supports a speaker-focused 
 
 124. Id.; see also id. (“[T]he expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of 
contributing.”). 
 125. Even if the First Amendment “covers” contributions as expressive conduct, the 
government’s justification for restricting contributions has nothing to do with cutting 
off their symbolic support for a candidate, and it is okay to limit expressive conduct 
when the law seeks to prevent harms unrelated to the communicative impact of 
speech. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 291-96 (2000) (plurality opinion); id. 
at 310 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968). But see BeVier, 
supra note 57, at 1058-60 (offering a thoughtful rebuttal to this argument). Rather, the 
constitutionally problematic aspect of campaign finance rules, in my view, is the 
government’s patent effort to influence the distribution of speech resources. See infra 
Part III.B; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17 (per curiam) (explaining that contributions are 
not subject to O’Brien analysis). 
 126. Compare Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“Money is property; it is not speech.”), id. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“[A] decision to contribute money to a campaign is a matter of First Amendment 
concern—not because money is speech (it is not); but because it enables speech.”), and 
Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953, 971 (2011) (“In 
sum, giving and spending money are not expressive enough to warrant First 
Amendment protection as speech.”), with Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, 
Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 54 (1997) (“Gifts of money 
and the expenditure of money are forms of speech.”). Scholars typically describe Buckley 
as equating money and speech. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—
Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (2012) (mentioning “Buckley’s 
debatable equation that ‘money is speech’”); David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo: 
Eviscerating the Line Between Candidate Contributions and Independent Expenditures, 14 J.L. 
& POL. 33, 35 (1998) (“Buckley effectively equated speech with money . . . .”). 
 127. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (per curiam). 
 128. Sullivan, supra note 57, at 666. Deborah Hellman concludes that “it is not at all clear 
that the Buckley Court really treats giving and spending of money as speech because it is 
expressive, though it appears to endorse this rationale for doing so.” Hellman, supra 
note 126, at 971. 
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rather than law-focused approach to First Amendment coverage for 
nonexpressive conduct.129  
C. Compelled Subsidies 
Compelled-subsidy cases present the mirror image of campaign finance 
cases: instead of restricting monetary transfers that facilitate speech, the 
government compels them (e.g., union-shop dues).130 Not surprisingly, these 
cases raise a particularly challenging set of issues tied to free speech rights, 
including associational rights. And scholars have rightly criticized the Supreme 
Court’s response as both erratic and lacking a sound theoretical foundation.131 
The seminal compelled-subsidy case is Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,132 
decided only a year after Buckley. In Abood, a group of nonunion teachers 
challenged a Michigan law requiring payment of union fees equal to regular 
union dues.133 The Court divided the teachers’ First Amendment challenge in 
two. First, the Court held that, although “compel[ling] employees financially to 
support their collective-bargaining representative has an impact upon their 
First Amendment interests,” the intrusion was “constitutionally justified” 
because of the union’s pivotal role in collective bargaining.134 Essentially, the 
government could require nonunion teachers to pay for collective-bargaining 
expenses to prevent them from “free riding” on union efforts. Second, the 
Court considered the teachers’ argument that they should be allowed to block 
the union from spending mandatory fees on speech activities “unrelated to its 
duties as exclusive bargaining representative.”135 On this issue, the Court ruled 
in favor of the nonunion teachers. 
Underlying the Buckley decision, the Abood Court explained, was the 
principle that “contributing to an organization for the purpose of spreading a 
political message is protected by the First Amendment.”136 This understanding 
of Buckley was sound, but the Abood Court followed this statement with two 
curious sentences:  
 
 129. But see Francione, supra note 52, at 460 n.150 (“Both Buckley and [First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)] . . . involved speech, not noncommunicative 
preconditions to speech. . . . Buckley and Bellotti simply do not support an argument that 
noncommunicative preconditions to speech are protected by the first amendment.”). 
 130. See Schwartzman, supra note 30, at 381-82. 
 131. See Post, supra note 58, at 228 (“The only hope of avoiding a string of precedents as self-
evidently ragged as [the compelled-subsidy cases] is to repudiate the premise of 
[compelled-subsidy doctrine] and to rethink the fundamental question of when the 
compelled subsidization of speech does and does not raise First Amendment issues.”). 
 132. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 133. Id. at 211-12. 
 134. Id. at 222. 
 135. Id. at 234. 
 136. Id.  
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The fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather than prohibited from 
making, contributions for political purposes works no less an infringement of 
their constitutional rights. For at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion 
that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society 
one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced 
by the State.137 
These are ill-fitting rationales. The monetary transfers were mandatory 
irrespective of the teachers’ personal views, leaving the teachers perfectly free 
to think and say whatever they wanted. To be sure, being forced to transfer 
funds could violate an individual’s conscience.138 But the teachers did not claim a 
religious or moral objection to funding the union’s speech.139 
The better reading of the decision—notwithstanding the Court’s tortured 
explanation—is that Abood is the mirror image of Buckley. In short, because 
money can facilitate speech, being forced to give money can abridge the 
freedom of speech. On this account, the lofty invocations of “freedom of 
thought” and “belief” were rhetorically powerful but doctrinally useless; what 
really mattered in Abood was the speech-facilitating aspect of the subsidies. 
D. Associational Rights 
Associating with others is a common way for individuals to pursue their 
expressive goals, and therefore enjoys protection under the First Amendment. 
Like nearly any other speech activity, associational activities involve a mix of 
expressive and nonexpressive conduct. Consequently, restrictions of an 
association’s nonexpressive acts—from the ways that it raises money, for 
instance, to the rules it adopts regarding membership—can incidentally burden 
speech, raising the question of how far nonexpressive conduct is covered in the 
context of associational rights. 
Yet again, the Supreme Court initially gave broad free speech coverage for 
burdens placed on the nonexpressive conduct of expressive groups. This 
Subpart focuses on two particularly contentious areas of associational law: 
cases involving compelled public disclosure of membership lists, and 
 
 137. Id. at 234-35 (footnote omitted). 
 138. For a historical discussion of this issue, see Philip Hamburger, Religious Freedom in 
Philadelphia, 54 EMORY L.J. 1603 (2005), discussing religious objections to paying an 
“equivalent.” 
 139. See Post, supra note 58, at 227 n.134 (“It is odd to speak of violations of conscience in the 
context of nonideological speech like beef advertisements.”). In the context of religion, 
the term “conscience” usually refers to “categorical demands on action—that is, 
demands that must be satisfied no matter what an individual’s antecedent desires and 
no matter what incentives or disincentives the world offers up.” BRIAN LEITER, WHY 
TOLERATE RELIGION? 34 (2012) (emphasis omitted); see also Michael W. McConnell, 
Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770, 782 (2013) (reviewing LEITER, supra) 
(agreeing with Leiter’s definition); cf. Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and 
Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1457, 1489-94 (discussing other definitions of “conscience”). 
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challenges to antidiscrimination rules when groups prefer not to admit certain 
members. Because this Article addresses only freedom of expression, it does not 
engage with the noteworthy suggestion that associational rights might be 
derived from other parts of the Constitution.140 
1. Compelled-disclosure cases 
The foundational compelled-disclosure ruling is NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson.141 The famous civil rights case began when the Attorney General of 
Alabama sought to enjoin the NAACP “from conducting further activities 
within, and to oust it from,” Alabama on account of its unlicensed expressive 
activities.142 At that point, the State also sought and obtained an extensive 
discovery order imposing onerous burdens—including disclosure of the 
organization’s membership lists—having no apparent connection to the order’s 
ostensible purpose, which was to establish that the NAACP was engaged in 
unlicensed activities.143 Contrary to popular belief, the case did not involve a 
generally applicable disclosure rule; Alabama required all corporations to 
register with the State before undertaking in-state activities, but the law said 
nothing about disclosing membership lists.144 
The NAACP appealed the discovery order on First Amendment grounds, 
arguing that publicly revealing its membership would lead to backlash against 
its members.145 The Supreme Court agreed. Disclosure, Justice Harlan 
explained, was “likely to affect adversely the ability of [the NAACP] and its 
members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they 
admittedly have the right to advocate.”146 In other words, disclosure would 
indirectly burden speech, thus triggering free speech concerns.147 
 
 140. See, e.g., JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 
(2012); Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147, 150 (2006); 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 981 (2011). 
 141. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 142. Id. at 452.  
 143. Id. at 453. 
 144. Id. at 451. 
 145. Id. at 462. 
 146. Id. at 462-63. 
 147. The Court later explained that NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson recognized a “right to 
privacy in one’s political associations and beliefs,” Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 
Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91 (1982), and that compelled disclosure “may burden 
the ability to speak,” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010). The Court has tied 
this right, however, to demonstrated burdens on speech. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 70 (1976) (per curiam) (“NAACP v. Alabama is inapposite where . . . any serious 
infringement on First Amendment rights brought about by the compelled disclosure of 
contributors is highly speculative.”). 
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2. Associational-membership cases 
Another strand of freedom of association cases involves challenges to 
antidiscrimination laws that override selective admission policies. For 
instance, if a private group that engages in expressive activities wants to 
exclude women or gay people, does it implicate the First Amendment for the 
government to ban that discrimination? Consistent with its treatment of other 
incidental burdens before Arcara, the Supreme Court initially applied 
heightened scrutiny to incidental burdens that happened to fall on expressive 
associations.  
In the seminal case of Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court 
considered whether the Jaycees—a group promoting civic participation by 
young men—could be required to accept female members pursuant to a general 
antidiscrimination law.148 The Court applied heightened scrutiny because the 
group was forced to “accept members it does not desire.”149 First Amendment 
review, in other words, did not depend on whether the law directly restricted 
speech.150 As with other areas of free speech law, the Court viewed indirect 
effects on speech as sufficient to trigger heightened review. 
III. Current Doctrine 
Looking back on the Supreme Court’s treatment of speech-facilitating 
conduct from the 1960s through the early 1980s, two noteworthy features 
emerge. First, reasoning scattered throughout the Court’s opinions showed 
wavering support for some form of heightened scrutiny when the government 
indirectly burdened speech. As late as the 1984 decision in United States v. 
Albertini,151 for instance, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny to review the 
arrest of a protestor on account of his unlawful entry onto a military base. 
Without considering whether the regulated conduct was expressive, the Court 
simply stated that “[a]pplication of a facially neutral regulation that 
incidentally burdens speech satisfies the First Amendment if it ‘furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest . . . .’”152  
 
 148. 468 U.S. 609, 612-13 (1984). 
 149. Id. at 623. Applying heightened scrutiny, the Court upheld the application of the 
antidiscrimination law, finding “no basis in the record for concluding that admission of 
women as full voting members [would] impede the organization’s ability to engage in 
[its] protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.” Id. at 626-27. 
 150. For a defense of associational rights based on similar reasoning, see Seana Valentine 
Shiffrin, What is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 840-41 
(2005), which comments that expressive associations should obtain greater protection 
for their nonexpressive conduct because they are “special sites for the generation and 
germination of thoughts and ideas.” 
 151. 472 U.S. 675 (1985). 
 152. Id. at 687 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). Elena Kagan argues 
that the Albertini decision may have been based on “a visceral sense that an illicit factor 
footnote continued on next page 
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The second notable feature of these cases, however, was uniformity in 
outcomes. With only rare exception, the Court consistently rejected First 
Amendment claims involving nonexpressive conduct that violated general 
laws. Thus, while the Court was often saying one thing, results in a wide array 
of cases suggested that it might have effectively been doing another.153  
Indeed, the Justices were well aware of problems with protecting 
nonexpressive conduct,154 and they increasingly suggested that free speech 
coverage was limited to cases involving expressive acts. Shortly after Albertini, 
for instance, the Court addressed whether the First Amendment provides a 
right to solicit contributions. “To resolve this issue,” the Justices explained, “we 
must first decide whether solicitation in [this] context . . . is speech protected by 
the First Amendment, for, if it is not, we need go no further.”155 Doctrine, it 
seems, was ready for realignment. 
The doctrinal status of speech-facilitating conduct came to a head in  
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.156 This case arose when state officials in New York 
sought to shut down an adult bookstore for at least a year because of repeated 
sexual misconduct on the premises.157 Based on the impact of the closure order 
on the bookstore’s expressive activities, the New York Court of Appeals 
applied intermediate scrutiny under United States v. O’Brien and reversed the 
order as “broader than necessary to achieve the restriction against illicit 
commercial sexual activities.”158 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
reversed. 
The lack of targeting was pivotal. “[T]he sexual activity carried on in this 
case manifests absolutely no element of protected expression,” the Court 
 
entered into a governmental decision.” See Kagan, supra note 15, at 499. The better 
explanation, in my view, is that the Court gave little thought to what it was doing and 
simply grouped all incidental burdens into a common pool.  
 153. This argument simply posits a realist interpretation of judicial decisionmaking 
without claiming that doctrine should necessarily align with a realist understanding of 
past outcomes. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the 
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1084 (1990) (“[T]he legal realist’s effort to 
discern the law by looking not to what courts say but what they do may well be a 
valuable heuristic for predicting the outcome of any given case, but it is hardly an 
acceptable method for deciding cases.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-04 (1972). 
 155. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985); see also 
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 & n.5 (1984) (assuming 
arguendo that “overnight sleeping in connection with the demonstration is expressive 
conduct protected to some extent by the First Amendment” and clarifying that “it is the 
obligation of the person desiring to engage in assertedly expressive conduct to 
demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies”). 
 156. 478 U.S. 697 (1986). 
 157. Id. at 698-99. 
 158. Id. at 702; see also id. at 700-02 (discussing procedural history). 
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explained, “[n]or does the . . . New York Public Health Law inevitably single out 
bookstores or others engaged in First Amendment protected activities for the 
imposition of its burden.”159 In other words, the case involved the regulation of 
nonexpressive conduct by a general law. Accordingly, in the Court’s view, the 
First Amendment did not apply. The O’Brien test, Chief Justice Burger 
explained for the Court, “has no relevance to a statute directed at imposing 
sanctions on nonexpressive activity.”160 
Nor did incidental speech-restrictive effects bring the First Amendment 
into play. That argument, the Court declared, “proves too much.”161 Indeed, 
“every civil and criminal remedy imposes some conceivable burden on First 
Amendment protected activities.”162 For instance, someone “liable for a civil 
damages award has less money to spend on paid political announcements or to 
contribute to political causes, yet no one would suggest that such liability gives 
rise to a valid First Amendment claim.”163 Thus, the Court held, regulations 
having an incidental effect on speech activities trigger heightened scrutiny 
“only where it was conduct with a significant expressive element that drew the 
legal remedy in the first place,”164 or “where a statute based on a nonexpressive 
activity has the inevitable effect of singling out those engaged in expressive 
activity.”165 In other words, expressive conduct and targeted laws each bring 
the First Amendment into play, but general regulations of nonexpressive 
conduct do not. 
Following Arcara’s open embrace of anti-targeting when it comes to 
speech-facilitating conduct, the Supreme Court has not looked back. In the 
thirty years since the decision, the Court has affirmed over and over that 
restrictions of nonexpressive conduct that incidentally burden speech do not 
trigger elevated First Amendment review. As Jed Rubenfeld observes, “there is 
no such thing as a free speech immunity based on the claim that someone 
wants to break an otherwise constitutional law for expressive purposes.”167 
The consistency of prior outcomes with the anti-targeting principle, however, 
has led the Court not to overrule its earlier decisions, lending confusion to 
several doctrinal areas. 
 
 159. Id. at 705. 
 160. Id. at 707. 
 161. Id. at 705-06. 
 162. Id. at 706. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id.; see also Srinivasan, supra note 15, at 410 (“The Court’s use of O’Brien and Clark to 
illustrate the Arcara rule’s meaning suggests that the rule should be construed 
narrowly, so that incidental restraints only concern the First Amendment when the 
activity that draws the law’s application is itself used to express a message.”). 
 165. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 706-07. For discussion of this category, see infra notes 256-73 and 
accompanying text. 
 167. Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 769; see also supra note 52 (collecting sources).  
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A. Information Gathering 
Following Arcara, the Court has considerably backed off its earlier hint 
that information-gathering claims might, in some circumstances, proceed 
based on the incidental effects of general laws. In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., for 
instance, the Court held that journalists cannot receive First Amendment 
exemptions from liability for breaching promises.168 But unlike in Branzburg, 
where the Court observed that “a State’s interest must be ‘compelling’ or 
‘paramount’ to justify even an indirect burden on First Amendment rights,”169 
in Cowles Media the Justices did not seem to think that indirect burdens on 
speech triggered heightened scrutiny. According to the Court, “generally 
applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their 
enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and 
report the news.”170 Lower courts have recently followed suit, often 
categorically rejecting newsgathering claims.171 
The Court has consistently followed this approach ever since. The Justices 
have explained, for instance, that trespassing laws can be enforced without 
implicating the First Amendment, even when doing so incidentally burdens 
speech.172 The same principle guided the Court’s declaration in Los Angeles 
Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp. that “a governmental 
denial of access to information in its possession” does not abridge the freedom 
of speech and press,173 notwithstanding the obvious inhibiting effect that such 
a denial may have on public debate. 
 
 168. 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991). 
 169. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972). 
 170. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 669. The term “generally applicable law” has several meanings, 
and the immediate purpose of the Court’s statement in Cowles Media was to clarify 
“only . . . that the press gets no special exemption from press-neutral laws.” Volokh, 
Speech as Conduct, supra note 50, at 1294. Thus, speakers may still “raise as a defense the 
fact that the law is being applied to them because of their speech,” even if the law is 
facially speech-neutral. Id. at 1296 (emphasis omitted). But Cowles Media also clarifies 
that restrictions of nonexpressive conduct by general laws do not trigger heightened 
review. See Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 669; Alan E. Garfield, The Mischief of Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co., 35 GA. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2001). 
 171. See United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 494 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2013). The Court has 
characterized the Branzburg holding in a way that reflects this view. See Cowles Media, 
501 U.S. at 669. 
 172. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123 (2003). Writing before Hicks, Srikanth 
Srinivasan argued that the Court’s earlier ruling in Albertini—applying O’Brien review 
to a trespassing violation—“must be an exception to the Arcara rule.” Srinivasan, supra 
note 15, at 413. In my view, the Court’s method of decision in Albertini simply does not 
reflect current doctrine following Arcara. See supra note 152. 
 173. 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999). 
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B. Campaign Contributions 
Recent information-gathering decisions have shifted to an anti-targeting 
approach, but the Court has yet to openly reorient campaign finance doctrine, 
leading some scholars to conclude that “indispensable” preconditions of speech 
are constitutionally protected.174 This view has considerable appeal. “In any 
economy operated on even the most rudimentary principles of division of 
labor,” Justice Scalia has explained, “effective public communication requires 
the speaker to make use of the services of others.”175 Accordingly, “[t]he right to 
speak would be largely ineffective if it did not include the right to engage in 
financial transactions that are the incidents of its exercise.”176 Indeed, as 
previously explained, the Court’s foundational decision in Buckley v. Valeo 
relied on the idea that contributions to political candidates “may result in 
political expression . . . by someone other than the contributor.”177 
As Justice White pointed out in his separate opinion in Buckley, however, 
“the argument that money is speech and that limiting the flow of money to the 
speaker violates the First Amendment proves entirely too much.”178 At the 
heart of this concern was a recognition that countless laws affect speech. Tax 
laws, labor regulations, environmental standards, and so forth, all routinely 
impose costs—diverting countless dollars from speech activities.179 Sometimes 
these costs are onerous. “But it has not been suggested, nor could it be 
successfully,” Justice White aptly explained, “that these laws . . . are invalid 
because they siphon off or prevent the accumulation of large sums that would 
otherwise be available for communicative activities.”180  
Sure enough, fourteen years after Buckley, the Supreme Court seemed to 
clarify that heightened First Amendment review is not triggered whenever the 
application of a rule “make[s] the exercise of First Amendment rights more 
difficult,” even in situations where the restricted activity is “essential” or 
“necessary” to engage in protected speech.181 The Court thus rejected a 
university’s argument that being forced to turn over otherwise private tenure-
review materials would negatively affect its expressive activities, explaining 
that “if the University’s attenuated claim were accepted, many other generally 
 
 174. Remus, Freedom of Thought, supra note 52, at 1496-97. 
 175. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 251 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 176. Id. at 252. 
 177. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1975) (per curiam); see also supra Part II.B.  
 178. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 262 (1976) (per curiam) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 179. Id. at 263. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 200 (1990) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 (per curiam)). 
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applicable laws might also be said to infringe the First Amendment.”182 But 
why, then, do campaign contribution limits still pose a First Amendment 
problem? 
The Supreme Court’s inability to answer that question has left campaign 
finance law in a state of uncertainty. A minority of Justices continue to assert 
that restrictions on campaign donations trigger heightened scrutiny because 
those donations facilitate speech.183 That approach, however, departs from the 
Court’s general approach to restrictions of nonexpressive conduct. Other 
Justices sometimes assert that campaign donations are expressive.184 But if that 
is the relevant concern, then contribution limits ought to be upheld; the 
justification for restricting contributions has nothing to do with their 
symbolic effect.185 
The anti-targeting framework supplies a more coherent explanation of 
why campaign finance restrictions pose a free speech problem. In short, 
singling out political campaigns triggers heightened scrutiny—not a misguided 
notion that “any regulation of money is a regulation of speech.”186 Thus, while 
the government can apply “general commercial regulations to those who use 
money for speech if it applies them evenhandedly to those who use money for 
other purposes,” it presumptively cannot target the expressive process of 
political campaigning.187  
In sum, giving money for speech purposes does not trigger heightened 
review. What matters is the law. Although the Court has not explicitly adopted 
anti-targeting as the guiding principle of campaign finance law, doing so 
would maintain consistency with other free speech cases that involve money. 
A law that “singles out income derived from expressive activity for a burden 
the State places on no other income,” for instance, triggers heightened scrutiny, 
 
 182. Id.  
 183. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“[A] decision to contribute money to a campaign is a matter of First Amendment 
concern—not because money is speech (it is not); but because it enables speech.”). 
 184. See, e.g., Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 636 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Another prominent 
argument is that contributions are protected by the freedom of association. See, e.g., id. 
at 637. 
 185. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 186. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 252 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (criticizing this notion). 
 187. Id.; see also id. (“[W]here the government singles out money used to fund speech as its 
legislative object, it is acting against speech as such, no less than if it had targeted the 
paper on which a book was printed or the trucks that deliver it to the bookstore.”); 
Volokh, supra note 20, at 1101 (making the same point). Of course, paper producers, 
delivery trucks, and bookstores are subject to all sorts of general regulations that raise 
no First Amendment problems. 
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even though the speech-burdening effects of general income taxes do not.188 
Targeted restrictions on the front end of the “speech process” raise the same 
problem.189 
C. Compelled Subsidies 
Following Buckley, the Supreme Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education190 extended free speech coverage to compelled monetary transfers 
used for speech.191 As the Court has cut back on free speech coverage for 
nonexpressive conduct, however, the basis for Abood has been challenged. “It is 
simply not true,” Robert Post insists, “that First Amendment concerns are 
implicated whenever persons are required to subsidize speech with which they 
disagree.”192 A trio of recent decisions illustrates the Court’s muddled but 
improving efforts to find a sound principle to govern compelled-subsidy 
doctrine. 
In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., the Court upheld a mandatory 
subsidy scheme requiring California tree-fruit growers to pool money to 
advance mutual goals.193 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens began by 
emphasizing that when the government regulates nonexpressive conduct, 
incidental burdens on speech do not raise a First Amendment problem.194 
Turning to Abood, Justice Stevens acknowledged that the law did “compel 
financial contributions that are used to fund advertising.”195 But being forced 
to subsidize tree-fruit advertising did not “engender any crisis of 
conscience.”196 “The mere fact that objectors believe their money is not being 
 
 188. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 
(1991) (applying heightened review to a law requiring convicted criminals to turn over 
the proceeds of their book sales); see also United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 
513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995) (applying heightened review to a ban on public employees’ 
receipt of funds for speech because Congress “chose to restrict only expressive 
activities”). 
 189. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010) (“Laws enacted to control or 
suppress speech may operate at different points in the speech process.” (emphasis added)). 
Thus, for instance, heightened scrutiny should apply to laws restricting access to 
otherwise public information based on the expressive aims of the person seeking the 
information. See Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 1079-80; cf. L.A. Police Dep’t v. United 
Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 42 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring) (hinting at this 
idea). 
 190. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 191. See supra Part II.C. 
 192. See Post, supra note 58, at 197. 
 193. 521 U.S. 457, 460-61, 477 (1997). 
 194. Id. at 470. Similarly, the regulation did not require the fruit growers “themselves to 
speak,” but “merely required [them] to make contributions for advertising.” Id. at 471. 
 195. Id. at 471. 
 196. Id. at 472. 
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well spent,” he concluded, “does not mean [that] they have a First Amendment 
complaint.”197 Justice Souter dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, arguing that a lack of conscientious disagreement 
with the tree-fruit advertisements was beside the point under Abood.198  
The Glickman decision revealed a Court at odds over the basic features of 
compelled-subsidy doctrine. The Court has not fully cleaned up this doctrinal 
mess, but it has suggested a new direction, focusing on laws rather than 
individual objections.  
In United States v. United Foods, Inc., Justice Kennedy, joined by the four 
Glickman dissenters, reinterpreted the Glickman decision and struck down a 
nearly identical cooperative law, this time involving an advertising scheme for 
mushroom farmers.199 The compelled contributions at issue in Glickman, 
Justice Kennedy explained, were “part of a far broader regulatory system that 
does not principally concern speech.”200 By contrast, the mushroom-grower 
assessments were “not part of some broader regulatory scheme,” and thus “the 
compelled contributions serve[d] [only] the very advertising scheme in 
question.”201 In other words, Glickman involved a general subsidy scheme, 
whereas the United Foods program was speech specific. 
Robert Post has argued that we should “rethink the fundamental question 
of when the compelled subsidization of speech does and does not raise First 
Amendment issues.”202 Justice Kennedy’s opinion in United Foods advances the 
ball further than Post lets on. The Court did not ground its holding on the 
freedoms of belief and conscience,203 or on the mushroom growers’ desire not 
to facilitate certain speech. Instead, Justice Kennedy asked whether the 
government had forced the mushroom growers to associate for an expressive 
purpose or, instead, for “a purpose . . . independent from the speech itself.”204 He 
concluded that by compelling mushroom growers to join a private association 
 
 197. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 
435, 456 (1984)). The Court also explained that “assessments to fund a lawful collective 
program may sometimes be used to pay for speech over the objection of some members 
of the group,” so long as the expenses are germane to the speech-neutral purposes of the 
group. Id. at 472-73.  
 198. Id. at 487-89 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 199. 533 U.S. 405, 408-13 (2001).  
 200. Id. at 415 (quoting Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Glickman, 521 U.S. 457 (No. 95-
1184), 1996 WL 629907). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Post, supra note 58, at 228.  
 203. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 413 (“Before addressing whether a conflict with freedom of 
belief exists, a threshold inquiry must be whether there is some state imposed 
obligation which makes group membership less than voluntary; for it is only the 
overriding associational purpose which allows any compelled subsidy for speech in the 
first place.”). 
 204. Id. at 415-16. 
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for expressive ends, the government had encroached upon their freedom of 
association. 
This analysis reflects a substantial, and much-needed, departure in the 
framing of compelled-subsidy doctrine. The constitutional defect that the 
Court identified in United Foods was targeting—forced association for an 
expressive purpose. Had the mushroom farmers been forced to associate for 
nonspeech reasons, and had the association then engaged in speech activities 
germane to that mission, the encroachment on speech interests would have 
been “ancillary” rather than “the principal object of the regulatory scheme.”205 
What matters under United Foods is the law—that is, whether the speech effects 
are targeted or incidental. 
The Court’s subsequent decision in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n206 
seems to reinforce this shift in compelled-subsidy jurisprudence. Johanns 
upheld a mandatory advertising fee imposed on beef producers because the 
speech at issue was “government speech.”207 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Scalia explained: “Citizens may challenge compelled support of private speech, 
but have no First Amendment right not to fund government speech.”208 
Notably missing from this analysis is any reference to the freedoms of thought 
and conscience mentioned in Abood and Glickman. Indeed, Justice Scalia noted 
that compelled-subsidy doctrine “invalidates an exaction not because being 
forced to pay for speech that is unattributed violates personal autonomy, but 
because being forced to fund someone else’s private speech unconnected to any 
legitimate government purpose violates personal autonomy.”209  
Johanns is still an uneasy fit with anti-targeting. After all, one could easily 
argue that the beef-advertising program targeted speech by laying an 
assessment for speech purposes.210 But separating two aspects of the program 
might answer this difficulty. First, the beef producers—unlike the mushroom 
farmers in United Foods—could not claim encroachment of their associational 
rights because association with the government is assumed. Second, the 
spending component of the program was immune from objection because 
individuals generally cannot challenge governmental spending on free speech 
 
 205. Id. at 411-12; see also id. at 415-16 (noting that Glickman involved an “ancillary” speech 
burden, whereas in United Foods “the expression respondent is required to support is 
not germane to a purpose related to an association independent from the speech itself1”). 
 206. 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
 207. Id. at 560-62. 
 208. Id. at 562. 
 209. Id. at 565 n.8 (emphasis added); see also id. (concluding that the First Amendment was 
not infringed “simply because individual taxpayers feel ‘singled out’ or find the 
exaction ‘galling’” (quoting id. at 575-76 (Souter, J., dissenting))). 
 210. Cf. Post, supra note 58, at 197 (“Johanns . . . never offers a theoretical account of why 
taxation is an exception to the basic premise of [compelled-subsidy doctrine].”). 
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grounds. Thus, with both the assessment and spending components insulated 
from challenge, the Court upheld the regulation. 
Although compelled-subsidy doctrine remains in flux, it seems headed 
toward stronger ground, consistent with other aspects of free speech doctrine. 
Yet again, the Supreme Court’s treatment of speech-facilitating conduct seems 
to have shifted to a focus on what the government is doing rather than on the 
conduct of individual speakers. While the government cannot “compel a 
particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for 
speech on the side that it favors,”211 incidental burdens imposed through a 
speech-neutral regulatory regime do not raise First Amendment concerns.212 
To determine whether heightened scrutiny should apply, courts ask whether a 
compelled subsidy exacts a disproportionate sum for speech activities in light 
of any nonspeech purposes.213 
D. Associational Rights 
Associational rights, too, have evolved toward the anti-targeting 
framework, although the Court has yet to fully consider how its general 
treatment of nonexpressive conduct would affect associational doctrine. This 
section begins by showing that an anti-targeting framework would not disturb 
the Court’s disclosure holdings. It then assesses membership cases. 
1. Compelled-disclosure cases 
As explained in Part II, the Court’s early compelled-disclosure decisions 
supported a right based on the incidental burdens of disclosure on speech. But 
two significant caveats are in order. First, these cases involved targeted 
regulations. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, for instance, Alabama had 
clearly retaliated against the NAACP because of the group’s expressive 
activities, and the onerous discovery request—which was case-specific and not 
generally applicable—was unrelated to the State’s claim.214 Subsequent 
 
 211. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411 (2001). 
 212. Id. at 415 (“[T]he majority of the Court in Glickman found the compelled contributions 
were nothing more than additional economic regulation, which did not raise First 
Amendment concerns.”). 
 213. Cases since Abood have essentially asked this question. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 
496 U.S. 1, 16 (1990) (holding that “[c]ompulsory [bar] dues may not be expended to 
endorse or advance” speech unrelated to a bar association’s core mission, but lawyers do 
not have a valid free speech claim against “compulsory dues being spent for activities 
connected with disciplining members of the Bar or proposing ethical codes for the 
profession”). 
 214. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463-64 (1958); see also Dale 
Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite 
Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1524 (2001) (noting that the disclosure order was 
intended to impair the NAACP). Stone writes that, “in NAACP v. Alabama, the Court 
used strict scrutiny to test a state law, as applied to the NAACP, that required any 
footnote continued on next page 
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disclosure cases have involved other types of targeting, such as disclosure laws 
that single out political campaigns.215  
Even more to the point, forced public disclosure is a form of compelled 
expression that forces organizations to communicate otherwise private 
information to the public. According to the Supreme Court, “compelled 
statements of fact[,] . . . like compelled statements of opinion, are subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny.”216 Mandatory disclosure thus presents a 
straightforward First Amendment problem under compelled-speech 
doctrine.217 The Supreme Court has not considered how its general shift in 
handling speech-facilitating conduct might apply to compelled disclosure of 
membership lists, but an anti-targeting framework would not threaten those 
decisions. 
2. Associational-membership cases 
Unlike disclosure regimes, general antidiscrimination laws do not target or 
compel speech. The application of antidiscrimination laws to expressive 
groups thus provides a way of testing whether, in the context of associational 
rights, restrictions of nonexpressive conduct implicate the First Amendment 
because of their indirect effects on speech. (Having to admit unwanted 
members, for instance, might decrease a group’s size or vigor, thus affecting its 
speech.)218 Carefully assessed, the reasoning in these decisions shows a lack of 
First Amendment coverage for indirect burdens on speech, thus supporting the 
 
foreign corporation seeking to do business in the state to provide the state with certain 
information, including the names and addresses of its members.” Stone, supra note 15, 
at 111. Disclosure, however, was compelled by a case-specific discovery order, not a 
general law. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
 215. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 89-90 (1982) 
(considering a First Amendment challenge to an Ohio law requiring political campaigns, 
but not other organizations, “to file a statement identifying each contributor and each 
recipient of a disbursement of campaign funds”); see also Carpenter, supra note 214, at 
1525 (observing that associational claims often involve governmental actions with “the 
goal of putting the screws on an expressive association”).  
 216. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006). And in 
the context of expressive associations, disclosure of membership information raises 
special concerns because it may reveal sensitive information about members’ views. See 
Brown, 459 U.S. at 97 (noting that even disbursements to vendors may reveal their 
“support for an unpopular cause”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (per curiam) 
(“[F]inancial transactions can reveal much about a person’s activities, associations, and 
beliefs.” (quoting Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J., 
concurring))). 
 217. Here, in contrast to the campaign finance context, see supra note 125, the government’s 
justification for the law is based on the communicative effects of disclosure.  
 218. In any event, externally imposed membership requirements at least burden collective 
expression, even if expressive output is unaffected. Individuals and groups do not have 
to stop speaking before a burden counts as a burden. 
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anti-targeting framework. And, yet again, the Court has quietly shifted its 
approach. 
As described earlier, Roberts v. United States Jaycees applied heightened 
scrutiny to the application of a general antidiscrimination law that forced the 
Jaycees to admit female members.219 After Roberts, however, the Court has 
consistently upheld applications of general antidiscrimination laws without 
applying elevated scrutiny so long as the regulation of a group’s membership 
does not directly change its expressive message. 
Several years after Roberts, the Court considered a case involving the 
application of an antidiscrimination law to Rotary Clubs, which also excluded 
women.220 The case was nearly identical to Roberts, but this time the Court 
denied the claim without applying heightened scrutiny, concluding that in 
light of the gender-neutral purpose of Rotary Clubs, being forced to accept 
female members would not “affect in any significant way the existing 
members’ ability to carry out their various purposes.”221 The decision did not 
cite Arcara, but it reflects a parallel evolution in the Court’s treatment of 
restrictions of nonexpressive conduct.222 
The Court reaffirmed this approach in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale. The 
Boy Scouts, which barred openly gay men from serving as scoutmasters, 
challenged the application of a general law banning discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation.223 The Court held that applying the law to the Boy 
Scouts interfered with the group’s expressive rights.224  
The Court’s reasoning in Dale focused on the direct impact of the law on 
the group’s symbolic expression. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist explained that “[t]he presence of an avowed homosexual and gay 
rights activist in an assistant scoutmaster’s uniform sends a distinctly different 
message from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on 
 
 219. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. 
 220. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 539 (1987). 
 221. Id. at 548. The Court noted in the alternative that, even if the act did “work some slight 
infringement on Rotary members’ right of expressive association,” that infringement 
would be justified by the state’s antidiscrimination goals. Id. at 549. 
 222. The Court later summarized: “The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group 
infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person 
affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private 
viewpoints.” Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). Bhagwat notes a 
broader turn in the Court’s association cases toward grounding in free speech 
principles rather than a freestanding associational right. See Bhagwat, supra note 140, at 
988-89. His point is well taken, but it should be noted that even if associational rights 
had been grounded in free speech principles all along, associational doctrine still might 
have undergone a significant transformation because of the shifts in free speech 
doctrine described in this Article. 
 223. 530 U.S. at 643-44. 
 224. Id. at 644. 
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record as disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy.”225 Accepting openly gay 
scoutmasters thus, in the Court’s view, would have directly changed the 
group’s message and its “method of expression.”226 
Dale has been the subject of considerable controversy, often surrounding 
the Court’s definition of “expressive associations.” Chief Justice Rehnquist gave 
the term a seemingly broad reach, explaining that “associations do not have to 
associate for the ‘purpose’ of disseminating a certain message in order to be 
entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.”227 Instead, “[a]n 
association must merely engage in expressive activity that could be 
impaired.”228 Scholars have criticized this definition as far too expansive, 
leading to widespread exemptions from antidiscrimination laws,229 and as far 
too narrow, failing to recognize the speech rights of nonexpressive groups.230 
A common perception seems to be that characterizing an association as 
“expressive” is doctrinally significant. Expressive associations, under this view, 
can obtain “First Amendment immunity from an otherwise constitutional law” 
simply because of their expressive goals—a reading of Dale that would perhaps 
support broad coverage for the speech-facilitating conduct of expressive 
groups.231 
 
 225. Id. at 655-56. 
 226. Id. at 655; see also id. at 653 (noting that the Boy Scouts had sufficiently shown that 
“acceptance of a [gay leader] would impair its message”). The dissenting Justices in Dale 
disagreed with this factual conclusion, arguing that the inclusion of a gay scoutmaster 
would “send[] no cognizable message to the Scouts or to the world.” Id. at 694 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). Perhaps so, but the majority thought otherwise. Accordingly, Dale 
essentially adopted Geoffrey Stone’s tentative suggestion that a general 
antidiscrimination law might sometimes restrict expression if an exclusionary policy 
“defines the organization ideologically and is a symbolic expression of policy.” Stone, 
supra note 15, at 112; see also David McGowan, Making Sense of Dale, 18 CONST. 
COMMENT. 121, 134 (2001) (noting the heavily fact-dependent nature of the 
constitutional inquiry under Dale). 
 227. Dale, 530 U.S. at 655. 
 228. Id.; see also id. at 648 (stating that “[t]he First Amendment’s protection of expressive 
association is not reserved for advocacy groups” and applies when groups “engage in 
some form of expression, whether it be public or private”). 
 229. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, How “Decentralization” Rationalizes Oligarchy: John McGinnis 
and the Rehnquist Court, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 11, 27-28 (2003). 
 230. Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 119, 139 (2000). Epstein’s criticism, however, is mostly directed at the 
Court’s view that associational rights are “derived from the free speech right, and from 
the free speech right alone.” Id. at 140. 
 231. Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1157 (2002); see 
also Carpenter, supra note 214, at 1570, 1573 (asserting that the Court in Dale “implicitly 
followed the analysis of Justice O’Connor in Roberts,” and that “[a]n expressive 
association, under this approach, enjoys a general exemption from anti-discrimination 
law regardless of whether the particular application of the law trenches on a certain 
message” (emphasis omitted)). 
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These arguments overlook the central reasoning of Dale, which turned not 
on whether an association is “expressive” but rather on whether particular 
membership requirements directly affect an association’s symbolic speech. 
Concluding that a group is expressive does not resolve this threshold question 
of First Amendment coverage,232 and the Supreme Court was not granting 
exemption rights to certain associations on account of their expressive goals. 
Rather, Dale holds that groups have speech rights,233 and sometimes 
membership requirements (such as those imposed by antidiscrimination laws) 
directly interfere with a group’s message, either by forcing it to send symbolic 
messages it does not want to convey, or by undermining symbolic messages it 
does want to convey.234 In other words, Dale involved a regulation of expressive 
conduct, based on a case-specific finding that a particular application of an 
antidiscrimination law directly restricted symbolic speech. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Institutional Rights, Inc.235 supports this understanding of associational rights as 
protection for expressive conduct, not speech-facilitating conduct. The case 
involved a federal funding condition that effectively forced private 
universities to host military recruiters on campus.236 A group of universities 
challenged the law, bringing both compelled-speech and associational claims. 
The Court began by considering the compelled-speech claims. Recognizing 
that the law, on its face, had little to do with speech,237 the Court explained 
that forcing universities to host recruiters on campus did not directly affect the 
universities’ messages. In prior cases, the compelled-speech violation “resulted 
 
 232. Other groups enjoy identical First Amendment protection in theory, but it is empty in 
practice because their lack of expressive purposes means that their membership would 
not reflect a message that an antidiscrimination law could change. For that reason, the 
Court correctly observed in Dale that “[t]o determine whether a group is protected by 
the First Amendment’s expressive associational right, we must determine whether the 
group engages in ‘expressive association.’” Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. 
 233. Daniel A. Farber, Foreword: Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and 
the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1495 (2001) (“The focus in recent cases such 
as Dale . . . is on the rights of the organization as an entity, not on the rights of its 
individual members.”). Recent decisions underscore this conclusion. See, e.g., Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (“The Court has . . . rejected the argument that 
political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently 
under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’” 
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 771 (1978))). 
 234. I am not alone in this reading of Dale. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 140, at 150. 
 235. 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 236. Id. at 51. 
 237. Id. at 60 (“The Solomon Amendment neither limits what law schools may say nor 
requires them to say anything. . . . As a general matter, the Solomon Amendment 
regulates conduct, not speech. It affects what law schools must do—afford equal access 
to military recruiters—not what they may or may not say.”). In addition, the law 
required universities to advertise, but the Court upheld these requirements as 
permissible content-neutral regulations. See id. at 62. 
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from the fact that the complaining speaker’s own message was affected by the 
speech it was forced to accommodate.”238 But being forced to host military 
recruiters did not have that consequence “because the schools are not speaking 
when they host interviews and recruiting receptions.”239 In short, the Court 
emphasized, “a law school’s decision to allow recruiters on campus is not 
inherently expressive.”240  
The Court then rejected the universities’ associational claims for precisely 
the same reason, noting that nonexpressive conduct does not enjoy 
constitutional protection because of expressive aims. “The law schools say that 
allowing military recruiters equal access impairs their own expression by 
requiring them to associate with the recruiters,” the Court opined, “but just as 
saying conduct is undertaken for expressive purposes cannot make it symbolic 
speech, so too a speaker cannot ‘erect a shield’ against laws requiring access 
‘simply by asserting’ that mere association ‘would impair its message.’”241 In 
other words, the universities’ associational claims failed because the recruiter-
access rule did not directly impact expression.242  
In sum, just as with other forms of speech-facilitating conduct, an 
unannounced shift has taken place in associational doctrine. The Supreme 
Court initially applied heightened scrutiny based on the incidental burdens of 
general laws, even when falling on nonexpressive conduct. The reasoning in 
more recent cases, however, has required more—a showing that changing a 
group’s membership would directly alter its symbolic message.  
 
 238. Id. at 63. 
 239. Id. at 64. 
 240. Id.; see also id. at 65 (“Nothing about recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any 
speech by recruiters, and nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the law 
schools may say about the military’s policies.”); id. at 66 (“The expressive component of 
a law school’s actions is not created by the conduct itself but by the speech that 
accompanies it.”). 
 241. Id. at 69 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 
U.S. 640, 653 (2000)). 
 242. The Court reiterated this conception of associational rights in Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010). The Hastings Law School chapter of the Christian Legal 
Society (CLS) objected that a putative “all comers” rule burdened its speech and 
associational rights by requiring the group either to give up university recognition or 
to accept students whose sexual conduct was inconsistent with the group’s mission. Id. 
at 668. Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg explained that it made “little sense to 
treat CLS’s speech and association claims as discrete.” Id. at 680. Rather, the Court 
explained, the group’s “expressive-association and free-speech arguments merge: Who 
speaks on its behalf, CLS reasons, colors what concept is conveyed.” Id. “When these 
intertwined rights [of speech and association] arise in exactly the same context, it 
would be anomalous for a restriction on speech to survive constitutional review . . . 
only to be invalidated as an impermissible infringement of expressive association.” Id. 
at 681. The majority went on to uphold the law school policy as a reasonable condition 
for access to governmental benefits under the “limited public forum” doctrine. Id. at 
692-94. 
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E. History and Speech-Facilitating Conduct 
We are now in a better position to evaluate competing scholarly accounts 
of First Amendment coverage for speech-facilitating conduct. Most scholars 
agree that the Supreme Court treats general regulations of nonexpressive 
conduct as not impinging on First Amendment rights, even when incidentally 
burdening speech. But are there exceptions to this rule? 
Geoffrey Stone argues that “[i]n a few decisions the Court has found 
incidental restrictions unconstitutional,”243 particularly “when an incidental 
restriction has a significant effect on free expression.”244 Elsewhere he explains 
that “the Court has held incidental effects unconstitutional as applied when the 
incidental effect of the law was seen by the Court as particularly severe.”245 
Michael Dorf agrees, arguing that, “[a]s a general matter, free speech doctrine 
treats substantial incidental burdens as raising a bona fide constitutional 
problem and ignores most other incidental burdens.”246 
Other scholars take a slightly different view of current doctrine, but one 
that still recognizes limited constitutional coverage when incidental 
restrictions have a derivative effect on speech. Dana Remus, for instance, 
asserts that the Court has recognized protection for “indispensable” 
preconditions of speech247—“a necessary corollary,” she argues, “to the right to 
communicate information and ideas.”248 Thus, in her view, “the Court has 
 
 243. Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
185, 206 n.69 (2007) (citing Dale, 530 U.S. 640; Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign 
Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982); and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)). 
Writing in 1987, Stone acknowledged that Jaycees, NAACP v. Alabama, and Globe 
Newspaper Co. could be viewed as having “involved a penalty on expressive activit[ies],” 
but such a view, he argued, would be “strained.” Stone, supra note 15, at 112.  
 244. Stone, supra note 15, at 112 (emphasis added); see also Stone, supra note 243, at 208 
(“[L]aws having only an incidental effect on free expression are presumptively 
constitutional and may be invalidated only in the very unusual situation in which they 
have a substantial impact on free expression.”). Later in the same article, Stone seems to 
reach a somewhat different conclusion, stating that laws are constitutionally suspect 
when they have “a highly disproportionate impact on free expression.” Stone, supra note 
15, at 114 (emphasis added). I agree with that latter view. My disagreement is only with 
Stone’s conclusion that the First Amendment applies “when an incidental restriction 
has a significant effect on free expression.” Id. at 112 (emphasis added). 
 245. Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the Twentieth 
Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 298 (2009) (emphasis added) (“NAACP v. Alabama, Brown v. 
Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Committee, and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale illustrate such 
decisions.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Stone, supra note 243, at 214 (“[T]he Court has 
invalidated laws when their impact on free expression was sufficiently severe.”). 
 246. Dorf, supra note 15, at 1210. Dorf1’s reference is to incidental burdens on expressive and 
nonexpressive conduct. 
 247. Remus, Freedom of Thought, supra note 52, at 1497 (noting constitutional protection for 
conduct that is “an indispensable condition of free expression.”). 
 248. Id. at 1496; see also Ferguson, supra note 59, at 653 (“[I]n the Buckley and Branzburg 
decisions, the Court acknowledged that certain forms of noncommunicative conduct 
footnote continued on next page 
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established a right to make financial contributions for spreading a political 
message because it is considered fundamental to the First Amendment 
guarantees of free speech and association.”249 Charting yet another approach, 
Srikanth Srinivasan argues that only laws “inevitably” limiting speech trigger 
heightened scrutiny.250 
All of these are plausible readings of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. 
What this Article has tried to show, however, is that efforts to synthesize the 
Court’s treatment of speech-facilitating conduct ought to account for historical 
change. Importantly, nearly all of the problematic cases cited by Stone, Remus, 
and Srinivasan can be understood as employing a conduct-focused approach 
that no longer guides Supreme Court doctrine. Although longstanding 
precedents are still in place—decisions like Buckley, Abood, and Roberts—the 
Court has struggled to redefine their conceptual premises. 
Access-to-court decisions might be an exception. Sitting in a courtroom 
gallery is not expressive conduct, even if it leads to expression later.251 Scholars 
therefore often point to access decisions in support of coverage for speech-
facilitating conduct. But does the Globe Newspaper holding support Justice 
Brennan’s open-ended declaration that “[t]he First Amendment is . . . broad 
enough to encompass those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated 
in the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the 
enjoyment of other First Amendment rights”?252 
Scholars should be hesitant to glean larger principles from access cases. 
Importantly, Justice Brennan considered the First Amendment question in 
terms of the systemic effects of a category of governmental action—not based 
on the speech effects in particular cases.253 The right of access, for instance, 
applies regardless of any speech-related reasons for attending court.254 The 
access rulings are still outliers in the Court’s free speech repertoire—notably 
 
are essential to the ability to communicate—so essential, in fact, that they cannot be 
restricted without also abridging first amendment rights.”). 
 249. Remus, Freedom of Thought, supra note 52, at 1496. 
 250. Srinivasan, supra note 15, at 402 (noting constitutional scrutiny of laws that “inevitably 
burden expression”). 
 251. See McDonald, supra note 7, at 269, 326; Stone, supra note 15, at 112 (noting that an 
argument to the contrary would be “strained”). 
 252. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982). 
 253. Recognizing this feature of access rights, Barry McDonald has criticized the Court for 
having “seriously undermined the societal purpose of a right of access by permitting 
any member of society to invoke it without demonstrating a ‘public’ justification for 
doing so.” McDonald, supra note 7, at 343. 
 254. Cf. id. at 325 (“[I]t is probably fair to say that most members of the public are likely to 
seek access to a criminal trial for reasons having nothing to do with engaging in speech 
about issues of governance.”). 
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coming before the decision in Arcara—but they offer little support for broader 
First Amendment coverage for speech-facilitating conduct. 
IV. Anti-Targeting and Disproportionate Burdens 
Anti-targeting defines the Supreme Court’s general approach to speech-
facilitating conduct—the clear holding of Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.255—and it 
provides, in my view, the most coherent account of decisions in particular 
enclaves where the Justices continue to debate the scope of First Amendment 
coverage.  
This Part fleshes out in greater detail how the anti-targeting concept 
works in practice. In particular, it argues that anti-targeting supplies a sound 
basis for affording free speech coverage to restrictions on photography and 
other forms of audiovisual recording—one of the most interesting emerging 
issues in free speech law. 
A. Disproportionate Burden Claims 
How should courts decide when a law impermissibly targets speech? As 
discussed in Part I, courts could reserve heightened scrutiny for laws that 
explicitly target speech acts. An ordinance barring protestors from using the 
subway, for instance, would explicitly target speech.  
But this approach would leave out many efforts to circumscribe speech 
indirectly. Consider, for instance, Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota 
Commissioner of Revenue,256 where the Supreme Court “struck down a tax 
imposed on the sale of large quantities of newsprint and ink because the tax 
had the effect of singling out newspapers to shoulder its burden.”257 As the 
Court later explained in Arcara, “even though the tax was imposed upon a 
nonexpressive activity,” heightened scrutiny still applied because “the burden 
of the tax inevitably fell disproportionately—in fact, almost exclusively—upon 
the shoulders of newspapers excercising [sic] the constitutionally protected 
freedom of the press.”258 (Importantly, this holding is not specific to the Press 
Clause; it applies whenever the government “singles out expressive activity for 
 
 255. 478 U.S. 697 (1986). 
 256. 460 U.S. 575 (1983). 
 257. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 704. 
 258. Id. 
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special regulation.”)259 The constitutional defect, in other words, was the law’s 
“differential treatment” of newspapers.260  
Notably, however, the Court was not endorsing a test where any 
incidental speech effects trigger heightened scrutiny, and it was not even 
granting free speech coverage for all laws that disproportionately burden 
speech. Rather, the constitutional flaw in Minneapolis Star was the fact that “the 
burden of the tax inevitably fell disproportionately” on newspapers.261 In other 
words, the effects that mattered were the anticipated effects, not the actual 
effects. To be sure, the anticipated effects depend on a judicial assessment of the 
real world, but the inquiry is legal in nature, not factual.262 
Plenty of laws might happen to burden speech disproportionately—that is, 
they might happen to burden expressive activities more than nonexpressive 
ones. A minimum wage law, for instance, might end up burdening news 
agencies more than other businesses. By specifying that heightened review is 
triggered by burdens that are inevitably disproportionate, however, the Court 
suggests that the disproportionate burden has to be apparent based on an 
examination of the law itself, rather than on a fact-intensive inquiry into the 
law’s observed effects.263 A minimum wage law does not satisfy this standard 
because the law does not target “conduct commonly associated with 
expression.”264 
Perhaps a harder case is a law banning child labor. For some, this rule 
might immediately call to mind an image of kids throwing newspapers onto 
neighborhood porches during early morning bike routes. But this example, 
too, is properly resolved in favor of the government (i.e., no First Amendment 
coverage), because the anti-targeting principle is not concerned simply with 
apparent effects on speech but—more precisely—apparent disproportionate 
effects on speech compared to the rule’s effects on nonexpressive activities. In the case 
of a child labor ban, for instance, newspaper delivery services might be the first 
 
 259. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995); see, e.g., Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (applying heightened scrutiny to 
“special obligations upon cable operators”); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2653, 2664 (2011) (describing Minneapolis Star as a case about speaker-based 
distinctions). 
 260. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 583. 
 261. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 704 (emphasis added). 
 262. Similarly, whether conduct is expressive is socially contingent, based on an assessment 
of how people communicate, but courts treat this inquiry as a legal one.  
 263. Cf. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988) (applying 
heightened scrutiny to “special licensing procedures for conduct commonly associated 
with expression”). Michael Dorf similarly concludes that “[t]his category comprises 
regulations that, although formally not directed at expression, apply to speech so 
disproportionately as to suggest that the government is targeting speech.” Dorf, supra 
note 15, at 1205. In other words, “laws subjecting speech to grossly disproportionate 
burdens are not incidental burdens at all.” Id.  
 264. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 760-61.  
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thing to pop into our minds when we think of kids working, but this intuition 
offers little guidance about whether countless other business will similarly lose 
out on the benefit of child labor. Thus, a child labor law would not trigger 
heightened scrutiny, even when applied to newspapers. A tax on newsprint, 
however, would surely have a disproportionate effect on speech because 
newsprint is conventionally used for expression. In the end, of course, 
boundary cases may become challenging—a point addressed in Part V—but the 
question being asked of judges is straightforward: Does the law target 
expression or something closely related to expression? 
The Supreme Court applies a similar approach to many other 
constitutional rights. Under the Equal Protection Clause, for instance, the 
Court has explained that “[t]he calculus of effects, the manner in which a 
particular law reverberates in a society, is a legislative and not a judicial 
responsibility.”265 Judges considering equal protection claims are thus “called 
upon only to measure the basic validity of the legislative classification,” not 
any disproportionate burdens that laws happen to impose on a protected 
class.266 Indeed, even if legislators know that a law will have effects that 
correlate with race, the law is constitutionally unproblematic so long as it is 
written in a race-neutral way and does not evince an effort to target particular 
racial groups.267 But governmental actions that reveal racial targeting can 
trigger heightened scrutiny even if they do not explicitly single out race.268 So 
too in free exercise law. “The Free Exercise Clause protects against 
 
 265. Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979). Others have noted this similarity 
between free speech, equal protection, and free exercise. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 15, 
at 781 n.15; Smolla, supra note 56, at 1114 & n.68; see also Stone, supra note 245, at 281-83 
(pointing out the Equal Protection Clause analog in earlier doctrinal development); 
Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
615, 672-73 (1991) (same). 
 266. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272; see also id. (“[E]ven if a neutral law has a disproportionately 
adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.” (citing 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); and Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977))). 
 267. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298-99 (1987) (rejecting an equal protection 
challenge to the death penalty, notwithstanding a documented racially disparate 
impact, because “there were legitimate reasons for the Georgia Legislature to adopt and 
maintain capital punishment”); United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 876-77 (4th Cir. 
1996) (en banc) (noting the uniform rejection of equal protection challenges to the 
crack/powder sentencing disparity, which also had a well-known racially disparate 
impact). 
 268. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000) (“Ancestry can be a proxy for race.”); 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (plurality opinion) (arguing that some 
classifications “should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection 
analysis”). Rice v. Cayetano was a Fifteenth Amendment case, but the doctrinal point 
would easily apply in other contexts. 
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governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt,” but mere differential 
effects on religious groups do not trigger heightened review.269 
As described above, the “differential treatment” principle in free speech 
doctrine operates in a similar way. The pertinent question is a legal one that 
asks whether disproportionate burdens on speech are obvious when looking at 
the law—not a factual one that asks whether the observed effects of the law are 
sufficient to create a constitutional defect, or whether the subjective motives of 
particular legislators were malign.270 The reason why is no secret. In the 
Court’s view, doctrinal tests better secure expressive freedom when they are 
objective, focusing on palpable legal materials and eschewing “amorphous 
considerations of intent and effect.”271 
In short, regulations targeting “conduct commonly associated with 
expression” raise First Amendment concerns.272 Laws targeting journalists, 
 
 269. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993); see 
also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706-
07 (2012) (discussing the requirement of “neutrality” in free exercise doctrine). 
 270. See Minn. Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983) 
(“Illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment.”); 
see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 117 (1991) (advancing the same idea). Nor will the Court strike down legislation 
solely “on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.” City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 
(1968)); see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582 (1991) (Souter, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“Our appropriate focus is not an empirical enquiry into 
the actual intent of the enacting legislature, but rather the existence or not of a current 
governmental interest in the service of which the challenged application of the statute 
may be constitutional.”). Instead of focusing directly on intent, the doctrine that 
implements the anti-targeting principle indirectly combats illicit governmental 
motives, and in doing so, it also helps ensure that the government does not arbitrarily 
impose disproportionate burdens on speech. Cf. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448 
(1991) (noting how First Amendment doctrine ensures that governments do not engage 
“in a purposeful attempt to interfere with . . . First Amendment activities”); John Hart 
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First 
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1485 (1975) (noting that a purpose of the 
First Amendment is limiting the “gratuitous inhibition of expression”); Kagan, supra 
note 15, at 414 (stating that the First Amendment “has as its primary[] . . . object the 
discovery of improper governmental motives”). Of course, failing to assess 
governmental motives directly may lead to judicial under- or overenforcement 
relative to “true” constitutional meaning, cf. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal 
Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1113-14 (1989) (criticizing this feature of equal 
protection law), but that is a conventional feature of all sorts of constitutional 
doctrines that account for judicial administrability, see, e.g., Richard H. Fallon Jr., 
Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1278 
(2006) (“Because the demand for judicially manageable standards stands partly distinct 
from the search for constitutional meaning, it is not uncommon for judicially 
prescribed tests either to underenforce or to overenforce the constitutional norms that 
they reflect.” (footnote omitted)). 
 271. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (plurality opinion). 
 272. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759-61 (1988). 
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book publishers, and artists trigger heightened scrutiny, whereas laws 
targeting airlines, pharmaceutical companies, and power plants generally do 
not, even though all of these groups sometimes engage in speech and help 
facilitate speech.273 
B. Recording Restrictions 
Do laws that disproportionately burden expression include laws targeting 
conventional means of communication, such as cameras and other audiovisual 
recording devices? The Supreme Court has not yet had such a case, and scholars 
offer widely divergent assessments of why, if at all, recording restrictions 
might trigger elevated scrutiny. Meanwhile, lower courts have given the issue 
little attention. As one leading scholar puts it, recent cases “in the main assert, 
rather than argue for, First Amendment protection” for recordings.274 
At first blush, audiovisual recording seems to be, as one court remarked, 
“conduct, pure and simple,”275 and perhaps therefore undeserving of any First 
Amendment protection. Seth Kreimer proposes an interesting way of 
circumventing this doctrinal roadblock. He argues that “the difference between 
capturing images and disseminating images erodes rapidly” as images 
increasingly “are immediately disseminated upon capture (as in live video 
broadcasting).”276 Thus, he asserts, limiting protection to “users who upload 
their images immediately and automatically” would put “undue weight on 
 
 273. Id. at 761 (distinguishing a law targeting newspapers from one targeting soda vendors 
on the basis that “[n]ewspapers are in the business of expression, while soda vendors are 
in the business of selling soft drinks”). Two additional points regarding the generality 
of laws: First, a provision that targets speech implicates the First Amendment even if 
the overall regulatory scheme is neutral (or even favorable) toward speech. See 
Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 577-85. (For a dissenting view, see id. at 593-94 (White, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); and id. at 596 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).) 
Second, the presence of exceptions for some nonspeech interests probably does not 
undermine the law’s generality unless the exceptions are so extensive that they reveal 
an effort to target speech. Cf. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534 (employing this approach in the 
free exercise context). For instance, issuing subpoenas to journalists does not implicate 
the First Amendment, see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (citing 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)), even though subpoena laws typically exempt 
lawyers, doctors, spouses, etc. An alternative approach would make speech a “most 
favored interest”—where as soon as exceptions exist for other social interests, but not 
for speech, the law loses its “generally applicable” status. Cf. Fraternal Order of Police 
Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 361, 366-67 (3d Cir. 1999) (Alito, 
J.) (employing this approach in the free exercise context). 
 274. Kreimer, supra note 32, at 368.  
 275. D’Amario v. Providence Civic Ctr. Auth., 639 F. Supp. 1538, 1541 (D.R.I. 1986), aff’d 
mem., 815 F.2d 692 (1st Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 52, at 1156 (“[I]t 
is unclear that taking photographs or gathering sound should be regarded as ‘acts of 
communication and expression.’”); McDonald, supra note 7, at 270; Mishra, supra note 
52, at 1550-51. But see Smolla, supra note 56, at 1112 (arguing that laws restricting 
paparazzi photography are “triggered only by acts of communication and expression”). 
 276. Kreimer, supra note 32, at 376. 
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technological fortuity.”277 Kreimer exposes how the line between expression 
and nonexpressive conduct can blur at the margins, but his doctrinal solution 
is unsatisfying to me. Conceptually, and typically, recording and disseminating 
are two separate acts. The fact that these acts are sometimes merged by 
“technological fortuity” is an unpersuasive reason to abandon the line between 
protected expression and unprotected conduct.278 
Jane Bambauer offers a different theory. First Amendment doctrine, she 
points out, is undergirded by concerns of protecting the creation of knowledge 
and preventing improper governmental motives. Putting these together, 
Bambauer argues that “state action will trigger the First Amendment any time 
it purposefully interferes with the creation of knowledge.”279 Thus, she 
maintains, all privacy-protecting laws, including audiovisual recording 
restrictions, should trigger heightened scrutiny.280 Bambauer makes a 
significant contribution—especially in the emphasis on laws rather than 
individual expressive aims—but her far-reaching prescription relies on the 
questionable argument that restricting access to otherwise private information 
abridges a freedom of thought derived from the First Amendment.281  
In my view, the anti-targeting principle offers a better account of why 
recording restrictions trigger heightened scrutiny. Cameras and other 
audiovisual recording devices are conventional means of communication—that 
is, they are conventionally used for communicative purposes.282 Targeted 
regulations of audiovisual recording thus single out conduct commonly 
 
 277. Id. at 377. 
 278. See generally Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (distinguishing between 
acquisition and dissemination). Along similar lines as Kreimer, Jane Bambauer argues 
that “it would be odd if First Amendment analysis of [regulations of] data could be 
radically changed just by moving data across a human eyeball.” Bambauer, supra note 
32, at 83 n.114. It is doubtful that “moving data across a human eyeball” makes conduct 
expressive, see supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text, but in any event it does not 
seem odd to me that doctrines implementing freedom of expression might ask whether 
regulated conduct is expressive. 
 279. Bambauer, supra note 32, at 63.  
 280. Id. at 83; see also id. at 63 (“[F]or all practical purposes, and in every context relevant to 
the current debates in information law, data is speech.”).  
 281. Consider, for instance, the difference between audiovisual-recording restrictions and 
laws against wiretapping. In the case of recording restrictions, the regulated party 
generally has lawful access to the relevant information, and thus, as Bambauer 
observes, recording restrictions seem “designed to cut down on communicative 
potential,” implicating First Amendment concerns. Id. at 83. The first-order aim of a 
wiretapping law, however, is to prevent access to private information, not to prevent 
dissemination of that information. The law thus seeks to prevent noncommunicative 
harm, and the connection to freedom of expression is at best attenuated. 
 282. Cf. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 577 n.4 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (encouraging use of the term “conventionally expressive” rather than 
“inherently expressive”). 
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associated with expression and impose an apparent disproportionate burden on 
speech.283  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently employed this 
approach in ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez.284 The case involved an Illinois statute 
making it a felony to record “all or any part of any conversation” without the 
consent of all conversing parties,285 “regardless of whether one or more of the 
parties intended their communication to be of a private nature under 
circumstances justifying that expectation.”286 The ACLU and several of its 
employees challenged the statute as applied, asserting First Amendment 
protection for their plans to record “matters of public concern.”287 The district 
court denied their request for a preliminary injunction because audiovisual 
recording is not protected expression.288 
On appeal, a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed. The court 
framed its analysis in terms of the law’s targeting of the speech process. “[T]he 
eavesdropping statute operates at the front end of the speech process by 
restricting the use of a common, indeed ubiquitous, instrument of 
communication,” the Seventh Circuit explained.289 Maintaining focus on the 
Illinois statute rather than the ACLU’s expressive aims, the court held that 
 
 283. See supra notes 256-73 and accompanying text. Kreimer deserves credit for developing 
this argument: 
Emerging efforts to constrain image capture do not target actions collateral to expression—
they sanction the disposition of information itself. Like prohibitions on sketching, taking 
notes, or memorializing observations in a diary, they bar individuals who have already 
acquired information from preserving it for future review, reflection, and dissemination. As 
such, they are not “generally applicable” regulations of conduct that adventitiously interfere 
with speech; rather they are targeted regulations in which the very definition of violation 
involves interference with a medium of expression. 
  Kreimer, supra note 32, at 391-92.  
 284. 679 F.3d 583, 601-02 (7th Cir. 2012). To be sure, the court’s lengthy discussion mentions 
several possible rationales for applying heightened scrutiny, but the court’s holding 
was that even if incidental speech burdens cannot trigger First Amendment review of a general 
law, the speech-inhibiting effects of a recording ban are “far from incidental” because 
“the statute specifically targets a communication technology.” Id. at 601-02. 
 285. 2005 Ill. Laws 1917 (codified at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1) (2014)), invalidated by 
People v. Melongo, 6 N.E.3d 120 (Ill. 2014). 
 286. 2007 Ill. Laws 2539 (codified as amended at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1(d) (2015)). 
 287. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois at 4-8, 
Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (No. 11-1286), 2011 WL 3892663. Particularly, the ACLU planned 
to engage in “open audio recording of on-duty police speaking audibly in public places 
while discharging their public duties.” Id. at 1. 
 288. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 589. 
 289. Id. at 596; see also id. (“Restricting the use of an audio or audiovisual recording device 
suppresses speech just as effectively as restricting the dissemination of the resulting 
recording.”). 
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some form of heightened scrutiny applies to “[l]aws that restrict the use of 
expressive media.”290 
Scholars have casually characterized the Alvarez decision as recognizing a 
“right to record,”291 but the Seventh Circuit avoided saying that recording is 
“protected conduct.”292 Rightly so. The Illinois eavesdropping statute targeted 
only the capture of audiovisual material, not its dissemination, and therefore 
did not regulate expression. The ACLU obtained heightened review, instead, 
because the Illinois eavesdropping statute “specifically target[ed] a 
communication technology . . . [and thus] burden[ed] First Amendment rights 
directly, not incidentally.”293  
Under Alvarez, plenty of restrictions on other types of mechanical devices 
would not trigger any First Amendment scrutiny. Machines that enable access 
to otherwise private information—thermal imaging or wiretapping devices, 
for instance—are not conventional means of expression, regardless of whether 
they happen to include a recording feature. Consequently, a law targeting 
thermal imaging or wiretapping devices would not raise a constitutional 
problem,294 even when expressive goals inspire the use of those devices, or 
even when those devices are equipped with a recording feature.  
Although praising the decision in part, Ashutosh Bhagwat has criticized 
Alvarez for its “fatally flawed” analysis that recording “necessarily targets an 
‘expressive activity.’”295 The court’s explanation is terse,296 but Bhagwat may 
 
 290. Id. at 595; see also id. at 602 (“[T]he statute specifically targets a communication 
technology; the use of an audio recorder—a medium of expression—triggers criminal 
liability.”). 
 291. See Bambauer, supra note 32, at 84. 
 292. Indeed, the court took pains to emphasize that it was not “immuniz[ing] behavior,” and 
that the government was free to restrict recording incidentally using a general rule. 
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607. “It goes without saying that the police may take all reasonable 
steps to maintain safety and control, secure crime scenes and accident sites, and protect 
the integrity and confidentiality of investigations,” the majority explained. Id. “While 
an officer surely cannot issue a ‘move on’ order to a person because he is recording, the 
police may order bystanders to disperse for reasons related to public safety and order 
and other legitimate law-enforcement needs.” Id. 
 293. Id. at 602-03. Moreover, while the Seventh Circuit discussed the public-accountability 
backdrop of the ACLU’s challenge, see id. at 597-600, the court did not apply heightened 
scrutiny based on a decision that the planned recordings were of public concern. The 
court mentioned that concept only once. See id. at 597. Nor did the Alvarez majority 
base its decision on impermissible governmental motives. 
 294. Froomkin, supra note 8, at 1510 (“General regulation of new technologies such as 
thermal imaging or passive wave imaging seems unproblematic on First Amendment 
grounds so long as the regulation were to apply to all uses.”). 
 295. Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 1040 (quoting Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 602-03).  
 296. In full, the court explained: 
The Illinois eavesdropping statute may or may not be a law of general applicability; as we 
have noted, it contains a number of exemptions. Either way, it should be clear by now that its 
effect on First Amendment interests is far from incidental. To the contrary, the statute 
specifically targets a communication technology; the use of an audio recorder—a medium of 
footnote continued on next page 
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misunderstand the Seventh Circuit’s reason for viewing the eavesdropping 
statute’s speech effects as “far from incidental.”297 The Alvarez decision does not 
rely—at least not explicitly—on the erroneous notion that every application of 
a recording ban necessarily restricts expression. Rather, the opinion simply 
says that the targeting of “a communication technology” created the First 
Amendment problem.298 By analogy, not all newsprint is used to produce 
newspapers,299 and not all campaign contributions go toward expressive 
activities,300 but laws that target newsprint or political campaigns have readily 
apparent disproportionate effects on speech. In determining whether speech 
effects are “incidental,” what seems to matter under Alvarez is what the law 
targets, not whether expressive goals are impeded.301 
Of course, this approach, along with any legal framework that 
incorporates social facts, could require difficult line drawing and, potentially, 
introduce path dependency into free speech law. That is, the ways that people 
communicate may depend, in part, on what the law allows. But this criticism is 
largely theoretical. In practice, whether people communicate with cell phones 
or thermal imaging devices has more to do with technological capacity than 
with questions of First Amendment coverage. In any event, legal doctrines 
often rely to some extent on social facts or norms, even when law has a role in 
shaping those norms. 
V. Defending Anti-Targeting 
The anti-targeting principle has quietly become the defining feature of a 
broad range of free speech law. This Part briefly defends this doctrinal 
approach. Without returning to first principles—an effort that would extend 
well beyond the scope of this Article—my emphasis is on widely accepted 
 
expression—triggers criminal liability. The law’s legal sanction is directly leveled against the 
expressive element of an expressive activity. As such, the statute burdens First Amendment 
rights directly, not incidentally. 
  Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 602-03. 
 297. Id. at 602. 
 298. Id.  
 299. See Newsprint Paper Rolls & Newsprint Paper Sheets, U.S. PACKAGING & WRAPPING            
LLC (Sept. 1, 2011), http://packagingblog.org/2011/09/01/newsprint-paper-rolls        
-newsprint-paper-sheets (listing many nonexpressive uses of newsprint, including as 
wrapping paper, packaging material, and disposable table cloths).  
 300. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 263 (1976) (per curiam) (White, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“[M]oney is not always equivalent to or used for speech, even in 
the context of political campaigns.”). 
 301. It is worth emphasizing, once again, that this Article deals only with the question of 
First Amendment “coverage,” not whether particular recording restrictions should 
survive some form of heightened scrutiny. For scholarship addressing this issue, see 
Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 1069. 
Speech-Facilitating Conduct 
68 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2016) 
54 
interests, such as combating illicit motives, ensuring ample opportunities for 
speech, and maintaining judicially administrable standards.302 
A. Protecting Nonexpressive Conduct 
One view of the First Amendment is that freedom of expression protects 
only expressive acts, and therefore nonexpressive conduct is entirely 
unprotected. “[A]lthough the Supreme Court has defined the boundaries of 
expression broadly,” one court of appeals has explained, “it never has extended 
the protections of the First Amendment to non-expressive conduct.”303 If 
“there is no expression at issue,” the court continued, “First Amendment 
doctrine simply has no application.”304 
Existing doctrine, however, does recognize free speech protection for 
nonexpressive conduct in many circumstances. And rightly so. Denying 
heightened scrutiny to all regulations of nonexpressive conduct might seem 
plausible at first glance, but the implications of that approach would be 
startling. The government could ban the purchase of computers or printing 
presses, prohibit the pooling of money for speech purposes, and require 
citizens to give money to partisan newspapers that support the government. It 
would be odd indeed if the government could target the preconditions of 
speech without any restraints. 
Asking whether regulated conduct is “expressive” therefore cannot resolve 
the question of First Amendment coverage. As Robert Post observes, a myopic 
focus on expressive conduct “frames the threshold condition for triggering 
First Amendment scrutiny far too narrowly.”305 Instead, “our First 
Amendment jurisprudence is concerned not merely with what is regulated, but 
 
 302. Accordingly, this Part will not attempt a systematic assessment of the anti-targeting 
principle according to particular “theories” of the First Amendment. See generally 
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982) (discussing First 
Amendment values); Schauer, supra note 19, at 1786 (mentioning various such theories). 
Most people do not view speech and press freedoms through a single lens, instead 
weaving together a collection of First Amendment values and creating a patchwork 
free speech doctrine. See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1786 (“[I]f there exists a single theory 
that can explain the First Amendment’s coverage, it has not yet been found.”); Stone, 
supra note 245, at 276 (“[T]here is no unified field theory of the First Amendment—no 
single test that can apply to all cases.”). Moreover, the term “freedom” can be 
multifaceted, so the First Amendment may simultaneously afford free speech coverage 
to expressive conduct and against targeted laws. Proponents of anti-targeting need not 
endorse Justice Scalia’s broader view that First Amendment rights are solely shields 
against laws.  
 303. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 304. Id.; see also U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999) (“As a threshold 
requirement for the application of the First Amendment, the government action must 
abridge or restrict protected speech.”). 
 305. Post, supra note 50, at 1255. 
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also with why the state seeks to impose regulations.”306 Viewed from the 
perspective of the individual, the First Amendment must extend some 
protection for speech-facilitating conduct; otherwise the government could 
starve the supply of speech. Restrictions on speech, after all, can occur at 
different stages of the speech process. 
B. Problems with Conduct-Based Approaches 
As discussed in Part I, one way to protect nonexpressive conduct would be 
to ask whether regulations of that conduct burden speech. The difficulty with 
this approach is that “virtually every law restricts conduct, and virtually any 
prohibited conduct can be performed for an expressive purpose.”307 For 
instance, “[a] parking ordinance incidentally restricts speech when applied 
against an illegally-parked newspaper delivery van,” and “the tax code burdens 
speech when used to tax a book publisher.”308 But few people think that these 
circumstances ought to trigger heightened review. Forcing judges to review all 
incidental-burden claims, Geoffrey Stone remarks, “would be a judicial 
nightmare”309 and “would open the door to endless litigation and encourage all 
sorts of fraudulent claims.”310 Indeed, the principal rationale for not granting 
constitutional protection to speech-facilitating conduct, the Supreme Court 
has explained, “is largely one of practicality.”311 
Most scholars applying First Amendment coverage based on the effects of 
a regulation on speech recognize the impracticality of applying heightened 
scrutiny to every law. Instead, they propose restricting coverage either to 
particular types of incidental burdens defined by subject matter, or to 
incidental burdens that substantially burden speech. These two ideas are briefly 
addressed in turn. Both approaches, in my view, face intractable problems. 
1. Domain-specific approaches 
One framework would limit coverage for speech-facilitating conduct to 
particular subjects or domains.312 Some proposals, for instance, call for giving 
 
 306. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 307. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 576 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). This point is widely recognized in the literature. See, e.g., Larry A. 
Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 
44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 930-31 (1993); Dorf, supra note 15, at 1208; Leslie Kendrick, Speech, 
Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1683 (2013). 
 308. Srinivasan, supra note 15, at 405. 
 309. Stone, supra note 243, at 208. 
 310. Stone, supra note 245, at 298. 
 311. Stone, supra note 243, at 208. 
 312. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.  
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special legal privileges to journalists.313 Others argue that coverage should 
depend on whether the activity is especially beneficial to the public.314 These 
issue-by-issue or speaker-by-speaker approaches are referred to here as 
“domain-specific.”  
A domain-specific framework would have certain notable benefits. Most 
significantly, ad hoc analysis would allow for more finely tuned doctrine 
tailored to the particular First Amendment interests at stake in each situation. 
A domain-specific approach also would find some support in other aspects of 
free speech doctrine.315 Speech about public figures or public issues, for 
instance, sometimes receives stronger First Amendment protection than does 
speech concerning private figures or private issues.316 Similarly, the Supreme 
Court has determined that some categories of speech have less value and 
deserve little or no protection.317  
Nonetheless, a domain-specific approach to nonexpressive conduct would 
come with considerable drawbacks.  
First, this approach would create enormous content-based line-drawing 
problems. The main challenge would be determining whether a particular 
domain ought to receive special protection. Proponents of scientific-research 
privileges, for instance, assert that scientific research is “a central and unique 
part of a highly favored process.”318 But how should judges decide whether 
 
 313. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 314. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 7, at 338 n.301 (“[A] newsgatherer defending against the 
application of general laws would first need to meet a ‘threshold’ showing of ‘news 
value’ before even being eligible for such a balancing analysis.”).  
 315. Robert Post, Regulating Election Speech Under the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 
1840 (1999) (“[T]he First Amendment has domain-specific applications . . . .”). 
 316. See Snyder v. Phelps, 132 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (“[W]here matters of purely private 
significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous.”). 
Interestingly, however, the Justices sometimes disfavor legislative efforts to carve out 
special treatment of newsworthy information. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 
648-49 (1984) (plurality opinion).  
 317. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (explaining that certain 
categories of speech, such as fighting words, libel, and incitement, are generally 
excluded from First Amendment coverage); Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 
U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (“[C]ommercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection . . . .” 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 
456 (1978))). But see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424-26 
(1993) (limiting governmental efforts to distinguish commercial and noncommercial 
speech); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992) (explaining that some 
forms of expression have “constitutionally proscribable content” but still are not 
“entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for 
content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 318. Roy G. Spece, Jr. & Jennifer Weinzierl, First Amendment Protection of Experimentation: A 
Critical Review and Tentative Synthesis/Reconstruction of the Literature, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 185, 214 (1998). 
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science is “highly favored” compared to other disciplines, like journalism?319 
And determining which domains to protect is only the beginning of the line-
drawing difficulties. Judges would then have to define each domain’s scope. 
What counts as “scientific research” or “journalism”? Adopting a domain-
specific view would require drawing content-based boundaries that define each 
domain.320  
Doctrines based on the identity of the speaker would pose even greater 
challenges. Consider, for example, the notion of giving a special newsgathering 
privilege to journalists. “Recognizing the privilege,” Lillian BeVier observes, 
“would inevitably entail the necessity of resolving difficult definitional issues, 
as courts would be forced to decide which claimants were legitimately entitled 
to call themselves ‘journalists’ and which were not.”321 It seems highly 
questionable that judges are in a position to make these types of unguided 
judgments,322 and the Supreme Court has shown a general unwillingness to 
venture into this uncharted territory.323 
This discussion is not meant to disparage doctrines that require line 
drawing. Nearly every aspect of modern free speech law separates cases into 
categories, asking whether conduct is expressive, whether the governmental 
action is content based, and so on. The anti-targeting framework—to which we 
 
 319. See Francione, supra note 52, at 477 (“[T]here is simply no reason to accept that 
information-gathering is more important for scientists than for journalists.”); Remus, 
Freedom of Thought, supra note 52, at 1503 (“There is no basis for asserting that the 
preconditions of scientific speech should receive greater protection than preconditions 
of any other forms of protected speech.”). 
 320. See, e.g., Francione, supra note 52, at 503-04; McDonald, supra note 7, at 309. Notably, as 
the definition of a protected domain becomes broader, the reasons for protecting that 
domain may become weaker. See Francione, supra note 52, at 463 (“If the general view 
seeks prima facie protection for every instance of what is sincerely claimed to be 
experimentation [or] research, then the general view would undercut its own premise 
that the first amendment should protect science because of its inestimable practical 
value to society and its theoretical importance to the marketplace of ideas.”). Similar 
problems arise in determining what counts as a matter of public concern. See Mary-
Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 578-
79 (2007); Eugene Volokh, The Trouble with “Public Discourse” as a Limitation on Free 
Speech Rights, 97 VA. L. REV. 567, 567-68 (2011). Some scholars see these problems as 
surmountable. See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 1065 (arguing for a test that applies 
when conduct “contributes in some substantial way to democratic self-governance”). 
 321. Lillian R. BeVier, The Journalist’s Privilege—A Skeptic’s View, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 467, 
467 (2006). 
 322. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 74, at 438 (“There is no coherent way to distinguish the 
institutional press from others who disseminate information and opinion to the public 
through communications media.”). 
 323. See, e.g., Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (“The balancing of conflicting 
interests of this type is particularly a legislative function.”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 
U.S. 753, 769 (1972) (“The dangers and the undesirability of making [free speech] 
determination[s] on the basis of factors such as the size of the audience or the probity of 
the speaker’s ideas are obvious.”). 
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will return shortly—is no different, requiring sometimes-challenging 
assessments of whether laws target speech or conduct closely related to 
speech.324 At the end of the day, some distinctions are essential; otherwise, First 
Amendment law would become a case-specific balancing test with virtually no 
predictability. And it is fallacious to suppose “that a distinction that cannot be 
sharply drawn cannot be drawn at all.”325 
A domain-specific approach, however, would require judges to make 
distinctions that they are especially ill suited to make. Whether audiovisual 
recording is conventionally expressive, for instance, requires only a basic 
understanding of American society; whether a journalist’s nonexpressive acts 
should enjoy special protection, by contrast, is far more a question of policy. 
Even for those comfortable with judicial policymaking, it is worth noting that 
most First Amendment doctrine is deliberately structured so that value-based 
choices (which are inevitable in any legal regime) are made only at a high level 
of abstraction, with a resulting web of categories and doctrines that seek to 
preclude content-based policy judgments in particular cases. “In the most 
profound sense,” Frederick Schauer explains, “the first amendment stands as a 
barrier to excess subdivision.”326 
2. Substantial-burdens approaches 
An alternative framework would apply heightened scrutiny whenever a 
regulation of nonexpressive conduct substantially burdens expression.327 In 
theory, this approach has considerable appeal. By employing a uniform method 
based on a neutral principle, this approach ostensibly would solve many of the 
line-drawing problems of the domain-specific approach. In practice, though, 
the problems created by a substantial-burdens method would likely prove even 
more unmanageable and underprotective of speech interests.328  
The most difficult challenges of a substantial-burdens framework are 
figuring out how to measure burdens and determining what level of generality 
to use in making that assessment.  
 
 324. See supra Part IV.A. 
 325. Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 
CINN. L. REV. 1181, 1189 (1988); see also Stone, supra note 243, at 209 n.75 (“[T]his is 
sometimes the nature of legal reasoning. General principles are useful to distinguish 
among different types of cases, but the principles are almost always imprecise at the 
margins.”). 
 326. Schauer, supra note 325, at 1198. 
 327. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 15 (advocating this approach). 
 328. Dorf recognizes many of these difficulties, but he does not respond to them “because 
they cannot be adequately addressed in the abstract.” Id. at 1210. In my view, these 
problems are insurmountable. 
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One possibility would be for judges to make case-specific assessments of 
the burdens on speech.329 A problem with measuring incidental speech burdens 
in these cases, however, is that regulations of nonexpressive conduct 
necessarily require an additional causal step before they burden speech.330 
Sometimes, identifying significant burdens on speech would be simple enough, 
but often this approach would require a perplexing counterfactual inquiry. In 
newsgathering cases, for instance, courts would need to determine what 
information claimants could have found by alternative means—an inquiry that 
judges frequently will be in no position to answer. 
Notably, this problem of attenuated burdens usually does not arise with 
respect to other exemption rights against general laws. Free speech 
accommodations under O’Brien and free exercise accommodations prior to 
Employment Division v. Smith,331 for example, involve burdens that fall directly 
on the constitutionally relevant activity. Under O’Brien, the restriction is 
imposed directly on expressive activities, so the case-specific effect on 
expression is readily apparent. The same is true in religious accommodation 
cases, where individuals attest directly to whether the governmental 
regulation causes significant burdens on their religious beliefs or practices.332 
With claims based on speech-facilitating conduct, however, the effect on 
speech would often be unclear. 
Similarly, looking to case-specific speech effects would make rights to 
engage in nonexpressive conduct dependent on contingencies unknown at the 
time of the regulated conduct. Consider, for instance, someone who sees a 
police officer performing her duties in public and decides to start recording. 
Should the legality of this amateur recorder’s conduct depend on whether he 
later puts the video online, or whether the recorded events become difficult to 
recount through other means? That would be unsettling (and potentially 
chilling) to the videographer. Similarly, it would be strange if a presumptive 
 
 329. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 677 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting); 
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 710 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 330. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 200 (1990) (noting that “the injury to academic 
freedom claimed by petitioner” was “remote and attenuated . . . [and] also speculative”); 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690, 693-94 (noting that burdens on newsgathering were 
“consequential, but uncertain,” and “to a great extent speculative,” producing “widely 
divergent” estimates). 
 331. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 332. To be sure, there may be logical steps between the governmental restriction and its 
burdensome effect. Cf. Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 199 (“[B]urdens that are less than direct 
may sometimes pose First Amendment concerns . . . .”). My point, which is orthogonal 
to that issue, is that the evidence of the burdensome effect is direct; courts simply inquire 
whether the religious beliefs or practices of the relevant individuals are burdened by 
the regulation. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014) 
(stating that “federal courts have no business addressing” the question “whether the 
religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable”). 
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right to engage in scientific research were triggered only when the results lead 
to publishable results,333 or if a presumptive right to trespass for expressive 
purposes were dependent on what intruders end up discovering.334 
Courts using case-specific assessments would also lack a uniform way of 
evaluating the significance of burdens. As Srikanth Srinivasan points out, 
“calculating the degree of speech-restrictive effect in different situations. . . . 
along a common metric seems unworkable, which makes comparing their 
extent in different circumstances largely guesswork.”335 Indeed, even in similar 
circumstances, the inquiry would be unwieldy. For instance, how should courts 
evaluate claimed tax exemptions for someone who spends every marginal 
dollar on speech, compared to someone who spends every tenth marginal 
dollar on speech? Would a general income tax impose a substantial burden on 
the first person but not the second? What if the tax effectively prevented an 
individual from buying a television advertisement, forcing her to purchase a 
radio spot instead? Should the IRS have to defend the assessment based on the 
particular circumstances presented by this reluctant radio advertiser? Would 
we care about the other ways that she chooses to spend her money—that she 
owns an expensive car, for instance? These would be routine cases. 
Case-by-case analyses would also lead to case-by-case results, creating 
considerable doctrinal instability and undermining free speech values. “It turns 
out to be incredibly difficult to identify and assess all of the many factors that 
should go into [a balancing] judgment on a case-by-case basis,” Geoffrey Stone 
explains.336 Consequently, the use of a case-specific approach “would produce a 
highly uncertain, unpredictable, and fact-dependent set of outcomes that 
would leave speakers, police officers, prosecutors, jurors, and judges in a state 
of constant uncertainty.”337 
 
 333. See Remus, Freedom of Thought, supra note 52, at 1503; Robertson, supra note 54, at 1218 
n.57. 
 334. As noted below, the typical response to this objection is to identify the relevant rule at 
a higher level of abstraction, applicable to many cases even though “not all of the 
considerations which justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each particular case 
decided under its authority.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).  
 335. Srinivasan, supra note 15, at 414. 
 336. Stone, supra note 245, at 275-76. Stone’s point relates to case-specific analysis generally, 
not just the analysis that might apply to speech-facilitating conduct. 
 337. Id.; see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343 (“Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs of 
the press and the individual’s claim to compensation for wrongful injury might be 
struck on a case-by-case basis. . . . But this approach would lead to unpredictable results 
and uncertain expectations, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower courts 
unmanageable.”); see also, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 66 
(2008) (“Given the vagaries of fair use doctrine, fair use thus provides a highly 
permeable, often merely theoretical, defense of First Amendment interests.”); Jones, 
supra note 56, at 1225 (stating that reporter-privileges doctrine “is uniformly regarded 
as confusing, resulting in a ‘privilege’ that is ambiguous, inconsistent, and the subject of 
significant criticism” (footnotes omitted)); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. 
Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1496-97 (2007) (“[A]pplication of the law 
footnote continued on next page 
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Collectively, the many problems with a case-specific approach suggest that 
free speech rights would need to be identified at a higher level of generality. By 
evaluating whether certain classes or categories of behavior give rise to 
substantial burdens, judges could provide individuals with far greater notice of 
their rights and could avoid unwieldy case-specific inquiries into speech-
restrictive effects.  
But despite its considerable advantages over a case-by-case approach, an 
approach that focused on speech burdens in various categories would almost 
surely prove unworkable too. 
First, the myriad factual problems described above would resurface, but 
instead of making case-specific factual determinations, judges would have to 
make classwide factual determinations. Do promissory estoppel laws 
substantially restrict news reporting? It is hard to know, largely because of the 
attenuated nature of the burdens on speech. Would judges answer this factual 
question as a matter of law, guided by logic and intuition? Doing so could have 
advantages, but it might also make decisions appear artificial or contrived.338 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court is generally averse to using empirical 
evidence to answer broad-reaching constitutional questions.339  
Perhaps worse, a category-based assessment of speech effects would require 
judges to engage in the unbounded enterprise of trying to define the relevant 
categories. Countless variables could be relevant. Consider a newsgathering 
claim where a journalist in the French Quarter of New Orleans gained 
unauthorized access to a private computer. At what level of generality should 
judges determine the effect on speech in order to decide whether restrictions of 
that conduct trigger heightened scrutiny? Would the relevant category be 
journalists who gain unauthorized access to computers, or journalists who 
commit any tort? Would local circumstances enter the picture, or would courts 
assess the burdens on a statewide or nationwide basis? Perhaps the dynamics of 
news reporting differ between Louisiana and Arkansas, or between New 
Orleans and Shreveport, or between the First Ward and the French Quarter. 
Perhaps professional sports reporters and amateur national-security bloggers 
deserve separate analysis. Perhaps speech effects differ year-to-year, or month-
to-month, depending on innumerable factors that courts have no competency 
to judge. 
Nor should judges rely on claimants to frame the relevant categories. 
Determining First Amendment coverage is a question of law, and judges ought 
 
[of fair use] has become so unpredictable that would-be fair-users can rarely rely on the 
doctrine with any significant level of confidence.”). 
 338. Cf. McConnell, supra note 74, at 451-52 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Citizens United for holding that independent expenditures do not create a risk of 
corruption). 
 339. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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to decide questions of law without regard to the legal theories advanced by the 
parties in a particular case.340 If a claimant asserted that her conduct was 
covered by the First Amendment based on the substantial burden of tort 
actions on journalists in southern Louisiana, the court would need to decide on 
its own if the claimant had correctly framed the relevant category for assessing 
the substantiality of speech burdens. 
As these decisions move to higher and higher levels of abstraction—as they 
surely would once judges confront these impossibly difficult line-drawing 
problems—the relevant tests would start to look more and more like questions 
of public policy rather than constitutional law,341 forcing judges to weigh 
speculative costs against speculative benefits. The substantial-burdens 
approach—ostensibly content neutral—would thus likely become the domain-
specific approach in practice, requiring judges to make a wide range of content-
based policy judgments.  
C. Advantages of an Anti-Targeting Approach 
An anti-targeting approach avoids the content-based line-drawing 
problems that would overwhelm other methods. Instead, judges would assess 
legal rules using a content-neutral metric, determining whether rules target 
speech—either on their face or by targeting “conduct commonly associated 
with expression.”342 
To be sure, this inquiry would not always lead to easy answers.343 
Restrictions on audiovisual recording, for instance, are especially challenging 
because they do not necessarily restrict expression, yet by targeting a 
 
 340. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99-100 (1991). 
 341. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular 
Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 699 
(2006) (“Both in daily parlance and as a technical matter, we draw a line between law 
and politics and see them as distinct categories.”). This is not to suggest that a neat line 
divides the two realms. My point is simply that as the level of generality rises, 
determining the “significance” of the speech burden moves further from the judicial 
ken. 
 342. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759-61 (1988). Similarly, 
whether conduct is expressive or nonexpressive does not require a content-based 
judgment. See Steve Keane, Note, The Case Against Blanket First Amendment Protection of 
Scientific Research: Articulating a More Limited Scope of Protection, 59 STAN. L. REV. 505, 527 
(2006) (“A critically important feature of expressive conduct theory is that it does not 
require a judgment about what qualifies as science.”). 
 343. See City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 788 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s new ‘nexus to 
expression, or to conduct commonly associated with expression’ test is peculiarly 
troublesome, because it is of uncertain scope and vague expanse.”). For one court’s 
struggle deciding whether encryption source code is closely related to expression, see 
Bernstein v. U.S. Department of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1139-42 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc 
granted and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999); and id. at 1149 (Nelson, J., 
dissenting). 
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conventional means of expression, they seem to be more speech-targeted than 
ordinary regulations of conduct. With these and other laws, judges have to 
determine in a common law fashion which types of laws are targeted and 
which types are not. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the Court has 
recognized this category of free speech law since the 1980s, with no apparent 
paralysis or disarray in lower courts. And a similar inquiry features 
prominently in other areas of constitutional law.344 
An anti-targeting approach is also likely to account for the mine-run of 
cases where the government has acted for improper reasons. As Elena Kagan 
persuasively argues, when a law targets speech, “a legislator cannot help but 
consider, consciously or not, whether and how the law will affect particular 
messages.”345 As Kagan puts it, “this is to say little more than that when a law is 
about speech, the legislator will consider its impact on speech—a proposition 
neither deep nor shocking.”346 Once the First Amendment is deemed to apply, 
judges use heightened scrutiny to help ensure the government is acting for 
legitimate reasons.347 
Importantly, a heightened risk of improper speech-related motives also 
arises when an ostensibly general law has apparent disproportionate effects on 
speech.348 Kagan explains:  
The relevance of hugely disproportionate impact to the level of scrutiny is, under 
a motive-based approach, no great mystery. What separates direct from 
incidental restraints is breadth: whether the law applies to more than just speech. 
If an incidental restraint has no such sweep, effectively regulating only speech, 
then the danger it poses of illicit motive approaches the level associated with 
direct restraints, and the same standard of review thus should obtain.349 
In sum, laws that target speech on their face or in their obvious effects pose a 
substantially higher risk of illicit motive. 
This danger of improper motives is present, though perhaps to a lesser 
degree, when laws target conventional means of expression, such as cameras 
and other audiovisual recording devices. To be sure, a recording device, just 
like a computer or a printing press, can be used for nonexpressive purposes. 
(For instance, these machines could serve as decorations, toys, or investments.) 
But the conventional use of a recording device is to capture audiovisual content 
in order to convey that content to others. A legislature that targets audiovisual 
recording is thus likely to have that conveyance of information in mind when it 
restricts the front-end use of the recording device. 
 
 344. See supra notes 265-69. 
 345. Kagan, supra note 15, at 496.  
 346. Id.; see Stone, supra note 245, at 298 (making the same point). 
 347. See generally Kagan, supra note 15 (explaining how free speech law is largely structured 
to combat illicit governmental motives). 
 348. Id. at 496. 
 349. Id. at 498; see Dorf, supra note 15, at 1205. 
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Consider ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez,350 where an Illinois statute barred the 
capture of audio without the consent of the recorded parties. The 
governmental interests in that case did not stem from the mere capture of the 
audio; indeed, the conversations that the ACLU wanted to record were already 
audible to those within earshot. Rather, as Judge Posner aptly explained (albeit 
in dissent), the legislature was seeking to prevent the conveyance of recorded 
conversations to a broader audience, and the most effective means of 
preventing such communication was to ban recordings at the front end. “The 
distinction . . . between an overheard private conversation recalled from 
memory and one that is recorded is something that everyone feels,” Judge 
Posner remarked.351  
Of course, the government may have ample reason to restrict the 
recording of audiovisual content that is otherwise available to members of the 
public. An interest in conversational privacy, for instance, may justify laws 
that restrict surreptitious recording.352 This Article takes no view on that issue. 
But the predominant reason for a legislature to restrict the recording of 
otherwise available information is concern over the dissemination of that 
information to a broader audience.353 And that is exactly the type of likely 
speech-related motive that has led courts to apply heightened scrutiny.354 
By contrast, general laws that do not reveal any effort to target speech are 
typically “poor vehicles for censorial designs.”355 As the Supreme Court has 
explained, “laws of general application that are not aimed at conduct 
commonly associated with expression . . . carry with them little danger of 
censorship” and “provide too blunt a censorship instrument to warrant judicial 
intervention prior to an allegation of actual misuse.”356 Moreover, when laws 
are general, their broad-ranging application increases the chance that ordinary 
politics will account for any unduly burdensome effects.357 
 
 350. 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 351. Id. at 612 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 352. See supra note 301. 
 353. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) (per curiam) (making a similar observation 
about contribution caps). 
 354. See supra note 270. Content-based recording statutes, such as bans on recording 
industry practices on industrial farms, raise even more acute concerns about 
governmental efforts to restrict the conveyance of information by targeting the front 
end of the speech process. See Kevin C. Adam, Note, Shooting the Messenger: A Common-
Sense Analysis of State “Ag-Gag” Legislation Under the First Amendment, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 1129, 1169-70 (2012).   
 355. Kagan, supra note 15, at 496; see also id. at 489 (making a similar point). 
 356. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760-61 (1988). 
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Conclusion 
The Supreme Court has wisely abandoned a vacillating and confusing 
practice of applying heightened scrutiny to regulations of nonexpressive 
conduct based on incidental burdens on speech. Good reasons may support 
granting First Amendment coverage in particular cases, but the doctrinal 
problem of incidental burdens on nonexpressive conduct has not admitted of a 
principled and predictable solution that relies on incidental speech effects. 
Anti-targeting offers a far better course. Stepping back from a granular 
focus on particular rights, a broader guiding principle comes into view that 
brings together the Court’s disparate treatment of various types of speech-
facilitating conduct. It is indeed true that “[l]aws enacted to control or suppress 
speech may operate at different points in the speech process.”358 But free speech 
rights do not protect particular forms of speech-facilitating conduct. When 
nonexpressive conduct is regulated, it is the law, rather than individual aims, 
that brings the First Amendment into play. Speech-facilitating conduct is 
protected indirectly—through rights against targeted governmental 
interference with speech. 
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